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A Theory of Multi-Period Debt Structure
Chong Huang, Martin Oehmke, and Hongda Zhong ∗
October 9, 2018
Abstract
We develop a theory of multi-period debt structure. A simple trade-off between the termi-
nation threat required to make repayments incentive compatible and the desire to avoid early
liquidation determines the number of repayments, their timing, and repayment amounts. As
firms increase their borrowing, they add periodic risky repayments from the back of the maturity
structure, with the time between repayments increasing in cash-flow risk. Cash-flow growth or a
significant risk-free cash-flow component limit the number of periodic risky repayments. Firms
with significant risk-free cash-flow component choose dispersed maturity profiles with relatively
safe repayments every period, rather than riskier, periodic repayments.
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Theodosios Dimopoulos, Itay Goldstein, Denis Gromb, Zhiguo He, David Hirshleifer, Dirk Jenter, Yan Ji, Konstantin
Milbradt, Emilio Osambela, Giorgia Piacentino, Anatoli Segura, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Sergio Vicente, Lucy
White, and Jing Zeng. We are also grateful to seminar and conference participants at LSE, UC Irvine, the London
FIT workshop, Einaudi Institute, the WBS Frontiers of Finance Conference, the 6th ITAM Finance Conference,
the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, CICF, SED, ESSFM Gerzensee, BI Norwegian Business School, New Economic
School, ICEF Moscow, Stockholm School of Economics, the HKUST Finance Symposium, the Colorado Finance
Summit, the 2017 GEA conference at the Bundesbank, the 2018 AFA, the 2018 RCFS conference, the 2018 FIRS
conference, WU Vienna, the 2018 EFA, Bocconi, and Bristol. We thank Ran Shi for excellent research assistance.
Oehmke gratefully acknowledges funding from the ERC (Starting Grant 714567).
How do firms choose the term structure of their debt? While a large literature has investigated
why firms use debt to raise financing for investments,1 we know much less about the determinants
of the number of repayment dates, their timing, and the respective repayment amounts. To shed
light on these issues, this paper develops a model of multi-period debt financing in a setting with
privately observed cash flow. In our model, a rich term structure of debt emerges from a simple
trade-off between providing the firm with incentives to repay and preventing costly early liquidation.
The main friction in our model draws on classic models of debt financing: Cash flow is privately
observed by the entrepreneur, such that the entrepreneur can abscond with the cash flow instead
of repaying debt. As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996) and Hart and Moore (1998), debt
induces a termination threat that makes repayment incentive compatible. However, in contrast to
the two-period nature of these papers, in our model the firm produces cash flow over many periods.
This multi-period setup allows us to study the optimal debt structure: How many repayment dates
should there be? What should the timing and size of those repayments be?
The key trade-off that determines the optimal debt structure balances default risk with the
incentives necessary to ensure repayment. Repayment incentives derive from the threat of early
termination. Specifically, the firm’s creditors commit to liquidate the firm if it defaults on any of its
contractual repayments. Early liquidation is costly because it leads to the loss of a longer stream
of future cash flows. The entrepreneur therefore would like to schedule debt repayments as late
as possible. However, there is a limit to how late repayments can credibly be made to creditors:
Towards the end of the project, the entrepreneur’s continuation value is lower, leading to larger
incentives to divert the cash flow and default.
In our baseline model, the firm generates a risky cash flow every period, drawn independently
from the same binary distribution (zero or positive). In this setting, we show that a repayment
profile with constantly spaced debt payments towards the end of the project is optimal, where the
1Classic contributions to this literature include models of costly state verification (Townsend (1979); Gale and
Hellwig (1985)), termination threat models of debt (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996); Hart and Moore (1994,
1998)), incentive-based theories of debt (Innes 1990), and theories based on information sensitivity (Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990); Dang et al. (2012)).
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time between repayment dates is determined by the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows. On each
repayment date, the firm pays back the entire realized period cash flow, in order to minimize the
number of risky payments. The cash flows between payment dates accrue to the entrepreneur,
thereby providing incentives to honor each of the contractual payments. All else equal, the larger
the amount of outside financing that the firm needs to raise, the larger the number of repayment
dates, and the more front-loaded the repayment schedule. A key feature of our baseline model is
that pledgeable income is maximized by scheduling as many repayments as possible, subject to
spacing these repayments such that they are incentive compatible. As a consequence, firms with
large outside financing needs opt for more repayment dates and earlier average repayment times.
This result echoes and extends the classic insight (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996) and Hart
and Moore (1998)) that short-term debt alleviates financing constraints that arise under incomplete
contracting.
We then extend our model to more general cash-flow distributions. Interestingly, the result that
a large number of repayment dates maximizes pledgeable income no longer holds when the firm’s
cash flows grow over time, or when there is a significant risk-free cash-flow component. When
there is growth in the firm’s expected cash flows, pledgeable income is generally maximized by
a debt contract with relatively few risky repayments towards the end of the project’s life (even
though the firm could in principle add more repayment dates). In fact, in some cases a single
(bullet) repayment maximizes pledgeability. For growth firms, the optimal debt structure therefore
resembles long-term debt with debt maturity closer to the maturity of the firm’s assets.
When the firm generates a positive minimum cash flow in each period, the debt contract that
maximizes pledgeable income depends on the riskiness of the firm. When the safe cash-flow com-
ponent is large relative to total cash flow, pledgeability is maximized by offering a safe repayment
in every period. If, on the other hand, the risky part of the cash flow makes up a significant
fraction of the firm’s overall cash flow, pledgeability is maximized by alternating between safe and
risky repayments. While safe repayments occur throughout the lifetime of the firm’s assets, risky
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repayments are scheduled towards the end of the project and need to be appropriately spaced to
preserve incentive compatibility. As in the case with cash-flow growth, increasing the number of
risky payments only raises pledgeability up to a point: Pledgeability is generally maximized with a
fixed number of risky repayments that is independent of project maturity. In this case, the optimal
debt structure resembles a combination of safe repayments and a number of risky long-term bonds
or loans.
The intuition gained from the model where the binary cash flow has a risk-free component carries
over to continuous distributions. Specifically, we numerically analyze the optimal debt structure
when the period cash flow follows a lognormal distribution. The analysis shows that when period
cash flows have limited upside (corresponding to low volatility), the firm’s debt structure features
frequent small and relatively safe repayments in every period. In contrast, when period cash flows
have significant upside (corresponding to high volatility), the firm’s debt structure is lumpy, with
less frequent but larger repayments, spaced out to guarantee incentive compatibility. Our model
therefore provides a unified framework that can capture both incentives to finance with smooth
debt structures consisting of frequent less risky repayments, and lumpy debt structures, in which
repayments are riskier and more infrequent.
Our model provides a unified framework to explain the choice of average debt maturities as well
as the granularity of corporate debt (i.e., how firms spread maturity dates over time). First, the
model matches many of the stylized facts on average maturities. For example, when period cash
flows are riskier, the average repayment time decreases, consistent with classic empirical evidence
on debt maturity in Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Custódio et al.
(2013). Higher profitability, on the other hand, is associated with more backloaded repayments,
consistent with the evidence in Guedes and Opler (1996), Qian and Strahan (2007) and Custódio
et al. (2013). Higher leverage is associated with earlier repayment, consistent with evidence on
the debt structure of leveraged buyout deals in Axelson et al. (2013), as well as the evidence in
Billett et al. (2007). Second, the model matches the key findings of the recent literature on debt
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granularity. In particular, consistent with the findings in Choi et al. (2017a,b), our model predicts
more granular debt structures for mature firms, firms with riskier cash flows, higher leverage, and
lower profitability.
In the interest of tractability, our baseline model abstracts away from savings, refinancing, and
discounting. However, as we show in a series of extensions, the key results of our model remain
robust to these more general settings. Most importantly, the general structure of the optimal
contract derived in the baseline model remains pledgeability-maximizing when the firm can save
cash flow for later periods or refinance its debt contract.
Our paper contributes to the literature on optimal debt contracts. We build on the literature on
debt as a termination threat (in particular, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996); Hart and Moore
(1995, 1998); Berglöf and von Thadden (1994)). While these papers highlight the importance of
short-term debt (relative to asset maturity), the two-period nature of these models does not lend
itself to the study of the optimal repayment structure when multiple repayment dates are possible.
A few papers have extended termination-threat models to more periods. For example, Hart and
Moore (1994) characterize the fastest and slowest way to repay in a deterministic multi-period
setting, but because of the absence of default risk, their model does not pin down the number
and timing of repayments, which is the focus of our paper. Hart and Moore (1989) contains some
examples of optimal debt structure in a three-period model with uncertainty. However, they do
not provide a general model of multi-period debt structure.
Our approach differs from the literature on optimal financial contracting in dynamic settings
(e.g., Gromb (1994); DeMarzo and Fishman (2007); Biais et al. (2007); DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006)).2 These papers derive the optimal financing contract in dynamic settings. In contrast,
we restrict the contracting space to debt contracts, which allows us to derive a rich set of novel
predictions on optimal multi-period debt structure.
More broadly, our paper is also related to the literature on debt maturity, albeit with a different
2See also the surveys by Biais et al. (2013) and Sannikov (2013).
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focus. We study how a firm’s debt structure (including maturity) emerges from the inability to
observe cash flows. In contrast, classic theories of debt maturity have focused on private informa-
tion (Flannery (1986); Diamond (1991, 1993)), whereas the more recent literature has highlighted
strategic interaction among creditors (Cheng and Milbradt (2012)), the inability to commit to fi-
nancing policies (Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), He and Milbradt (2016), DeMarzo and He
(2016)), and debt overhang (Diamond and He (2014)).
Finally, our paper is related to a series of papers by Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013),
who develop a multi-period model of financing subject to enforcement constraints. A key differ-
ence to our paper is the assumption regarding exclusion. In Rampini and Viswanathan (2010,
2013), no exclusion is possible, such that the optimal contract can be implemented by one-period
state-contingent debt contracts. In our paper, liquidation by creditors effectively excludes the
entrepreneur from future investment, creating a non-trivial role for debt contracts of different ma-
turities. Moreover, in these models, as in the models of dynamic financing by Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2004) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), the ability to write fully state-contingent
debt contracts implies that there is no default on the equilibrium path. In contrast, the possibility
of equilibrium default when debt contracts are not state-contingent is a key feature of our model.
1 Model Setup
Consider a risk neutral entrepreneur who seeks to undertake an investment project. At date t = 0,
the investment requires an outlay of I. The entrepreneur has cash at hand c and must therefore
finance the remainder D = I−c by raising outside financing from competitive, risk neutral creditors.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no time discounting.
If funded, the project lasts for T periods. At each date t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, the project generates
a random period cash flow Xt. For simplicity, we assume that period cash flows are independent
draws from a binary distribution. In particular, with probability 1K , the project generates positive
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cash flow of K∆, where ∆ > 0 and K ∈ Z+.3 With probability 1− 1K , the period cash flow at date
t is zero. Therefore, the project generates an expected period cash flow of ∆, while the parameter
K captures the riskiness of the period cash flow. As we will see, assuming a binary cash-flow
distribution with a zero cash flow in the low state makes the analysis particularly tractable and
allows us to highlight the key trade-offs in a transparent fashion. However, it is not without loss of
generality, and we therefore extend our analysis to more general cash-flow distributions in Section
3.
The main contracting friction in our model is that cash flow is privately observed by the en-
trepreneur. Therefore, at any date t, the entrepreneur can abscond with the cash flow that was
realized in that period, so that payments from the entrepreneur to creditors must be incentive
compatible. Incentive compatibility is achieved by a termination threat imposed by creditors via
the financing contract. We make three key assumptions about the contracting environment. The
first is that we restrict our attention to debt contracts. This distinguishes our analysis from the
literature on optimal contracting in dynamic settings (e.g., DeMarzo and Fishman (2007); Biais
et al. (2007); DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)). Second, following Hart and Moore (1995) we assume
that creditors can commit to liquidate the firm when a debt repayment is missed. As the analysis
of the self-defeating nature of renegotiation in Gromb (1994) shows, there are generally strong
ex-ante incentives for the firm and creditor to commit to a liquidation strategy.4 At the same time,
the amount of commitment required for our liquidation assumption seems realistic. For example,
one simple way to implement liquidation with probability one after a missed payment is to issue
widely dispersed debt, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001). Alternatively, even with a single creditor
commitment not to renegotiate can be achieved by purchasing sufficient CDS protection from a
third party that does not participate in renegotiations, as in Bolton and Oehmke (2011).5 Third,
3The assumption that K is an integer is for mathematical convenience. Our results are virtually unchanged
without that assumption, except for the added notational complexity of having to deal with integer constraints.
4Gromb (1994) shows that in a multi-period setting the ability to repeatedly renegotiate the debt contract severely
constrains pledgeability, up to the point where no financing is possible because of anticipated future renegotiation.
Due to the creditors’ ability to commit to liquidate, this issue does not arise in our framework.
5The amount of commitment required for unconditional liquidation in case the firm misses a contractual repayment
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for most of our analysis we assume for simplicity that the entrepreneur can neither carry forward
cash balances in the firm nor refinance the debt contract entered at date 0. Therefore, at each date
the entrepreneur consumes the period cash flow minus debt repayments made at that date. This
assumption allows for a particularly tractable characterization of the optimal debt structure, but
it is not crucial for our main results. We relax this assumption in Section 5, where we show that
adding savings or refinancing does not affect the main economic insights from our model.
The firm’s debt structure is characterized by a sequence of promised repayments R = {Rt},
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.6 If at any date t the entrepreneur has promised a positive repayment Rt > 0 but
does not pay, the project is liquidated by the firm’s creditors. Neither creditors nor the entrepreneur
receive any cash flows in or after liquidation (i.e., the project’s liquidation value is normalized to
zero, and the entrepreneur cannot undertake another investment after liquidation, either because
she is excluded from credit markets or because, without the original creditor, she has lost access
to his investment project). As long as the entrepreneur makes contractual debt repayments, the
project continues and the entrepreneur consumes Xt −Rt.
Denoting by Vt the entrepreneur’s payoff at the beginning of date t, a debt contract R is
incentive compatible if and only if Rt ≤ Vt+1 for every t ≥ 1. The entrepreneur’s payoff Vt can be
written recursively as
Vt = ∆ + Pr(Xt ≥ Rt) (−Rt + Vt+1) . (1)
This recursive formulation reflects that, at each date t, the entrepreneur generates an expected cash
flow of ∆ and continues to the next period, by making the contractual repayment Rt, whenever Xt ≥
Rt. Because the firm cannot save or refinance existing debt, the firm can only use contemporaneous
is significantly lower than committing to the optimal liquidation strategy, which is generally probabilistic and time-
dependent. In particular, this optimal liquidation strategy cannot be implemented via a dispersed creditor structure
and therefore implies a much higher level of commitment on behalf of creditors.
6The contract R can be interpreted in a number of ways. In the most narrow interpretation, R is the payment
schedule of a single debt contract that specifies multiple repayments over time. Interpreted more broadly, R captures
the firms aggregate debt structure, where individual repayments Rt are potentially separate contracts (i.e., a port-
folio of loans or bonds). While from a theoretical perspective these two interpretations are equivalent, the broader
interpretation will be useful in linking our model to empirical evidence.
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cash flow to repay debt, so that the firm is liquidated at the first instance that Xt < Rt.
Given risk neutrality, the entrepreneur chooses the repayment schedule R to maximize V1, the
value of equity at the beginning of the project. Formally, the entrepreneur’s maximization problem
is therefore
maxR V1
s.t. Rt ≤ Vt+1 (IC)
D(R) = D (IR), (2)






Pr(Xs ≥ Rs)Rt. (3)
The two constraints associated with the entrepreneur’s maximization problem ensure that promised
repayments are incentive compatible (IC) and that risk-neutral creditors break even in expectation
(IR). Given that the entrepreneur promises a repayment stream of expected value D and is liqui-
dated the first time that Rt < Xt (i.e., in each period the entrepreneur continues with probability






Pr (Xs ≥ Rs) ∆−D. (4)
In addition to the two constraints above, another quasi-constraint enters the entrepreneur’s
optimization problem. In particular, it is never in the entrepreneur’s interest to offer a debt
contract that defaults with probability one in any period.7 Therefore, any debt contract offered by
7Suppose, in contrast, that the optimal contract contains a promised repayment Rt > K∆ for some t. Then the
entrepreneur will default with certainty at date t, even if the positive cash flow K∆ is realized. Then, the creditor’s
IR constraint (2) holds only if the expected total repayments before date t are equal to D. However, if this is the
case, then the entrepreneur would adjust Rt to 0. This adjustment would not change the creditor’s IR constraint (2),
but would give the entrepreneur a weakly larger payoff (strictly larger if t ≤ T − 1).
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the entrepreneur will consist of promised payments Rt that are weakly smaller than the positive
cash-flow realization in that period,
Rt ≤ K∆. (5)
We will refer to condition (5) as the feasibility condition.
The binary cash-flow distribution combined with the assumption that the entrepreneur cannot
save or refinance allows us to simplify the above maximization problem. Specifically, with these
assumptions in place, the relevant choice variable for the entrepreneur reduces to whether to promise
a positive repayment at any particular date t. To see this, denote the set of dates with positive
repayments by Q ≡ {t ∈ T |Rt > 0}. Then, as the following lemma shows, it is the timing and
number of repayments that matters for the firm, whereas the exact size of each repayment is usually
not uniquely determined.
Lemma 1 For any two incentive compatible repayment schedules, R and R′, if Q(R) = Q(R′)
and D(R) = D(R′), then the entrepreneur is indifferent between R and R′.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 states that if two debt contracts R and R′ have identical repayment
dates and the same expected value to creditors, then they yield the same expected payoff to the
entrepreneur.8
2 Optimal Debt Structure
In this section we develop our baseline model of optimal debt structure. Section 2.1 presents an
intuitive derivation that characterizes the economic trade-off that determines the firm’s optimal
debt structure. Section 2.2 then formalizes these insights in a general proposition.
8Note that this result relies on the binary cash-flow assumption: The probability of making any positive repayment
Rt ∈ (0,K∆] is Pr(X = K∆) = 1K (i.e., the probability of a positive cash flow realization on that date), regardless
of the size of the promised repayment. This is reflected in equation (4) in that any positive repayment Rt enters the
entrepreneur’s payoff only through the probability of default at date t. Therefore, only the number and timing of
repayments is important, but not the size of each individual repayment. The indeterminacy of individual repayment
sizes is a special feature of the binary cash-flow distribution. For example, under a lognormal cash-flow distribution,
repayments are uniquely pinned down (see Section 3.3).
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2.1 Optimal Debt Structure: An Intuitive Derivation
The main trade-off that determines optimal debt structure is between early liquidation and sufficient
pledgeability. On the one hand, the entrepreneur likes to make debt payments as late as possible.
By doing so, the project is less likely to be terminated early on, providing the entrepreneur higher
expected cash flows. On the other hand, the entrepreneur faces limits to how late she can credibly
promise to make repayments to creditors. Towards the end of the project, the entrepreneur’s
continuation value is lower, such that she has larger incentives to divert the cash flow and default.
To see how this trade-off shapes the firm’s optimal debt structure, it is instructive to start by
considering a firm with low outside financing needs D. The nature of the optimal debt structure
then emerges as we gradually increase the amount of required outside financing. We develop these
results using several cases before moving to a general proposition that fully characterizes the optimal
debt repayment structure. The numbering of the cases will become clear as we move from case to
case.




. We start by assuming that the amount of required outside financing
D is weakly less than ∆K . Clearly, because VT+1 = 0, the entrepreneur cannot credibly promise to
make a payment to creditors at date T. Therefore, incentive compatibility requires that RT = 0.
However, when D ≤ ∆K , the entrepreneur can raise D by offering a single repayment of RT−1 = KD
at date T−1 (i.e., the set of repayment dates is Q = {T−1}). This payment is incentive compatible
because the entrepreneur’s continuation value at T − 1 is given by VT = ∆ (the expected cash flow




, exceeds the required repayment of KD:
RT−1 = KD ≤ VT = ∆. (6)
A single repayment of KD at date T − 1 also satisfies the creditor’s IR constraint (2), as D(R) =
1
KKD = D.
From equation (1), we then see that the entrepreneur’s continuation value at the beginning of
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date T − 1 is given by




so that the overall payoff to the entrepreneur in this case can be written as




Note that even though the entrepreneur can potentially choose to make multiple repayments or
offer a single repayment before date T−1, neither of these options is optimal. Intuitively, promising
multiple risky repayments inefficiently increases default risk. Promising repayment earlier than date
T − 1 risks that the project is terminated unnecessarily prematurely. Therefore, any alternative
schedule with a single repayment of KD at t′ < T − 1, which yields a payoff to the entrepreneur of
t′∆ + 1K [(T − t
′)∆−KD], is dominated by (7).







. When the required amount of outside financing D exceeds ∆K , a
single repayment of KD at date T − 1 is no longer incentive compatible: When KD > ∆, this
payment would violate the IC constraint (6). To support a higher repayment, the entrepreneur then
optimally moves the single repayment date forward to T − 2. Because now the final two periods’
cash flows are left to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur’s payoff from continuing past date T − 2
is given by VT−1 = 2∆, which provides the upper bound for the incentive compatible repayment at
T − 2:
RT−2 = KD ≤ VT−1 = 2∆.








can raise the required financing with a single repayment at date T −2 (i.e., Q = {T −2}) . Because
any additional repayment date would create unnecessary default risk, a single payment at date
T − 2 is the optimal way to finance the project.





. It is easy to see that as the amount of required outside financing
D continues to increase, the entrepreneur optimally keeps moving the single repayment forward to
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates the range of outside financing needs for which financing is possible
with one repayment date, cases 1-1 to 1-K.
maintain incentive compatibility. This is possible as long as the required single repayment satisfies
the feasibility condition (5). This leads us to the last case in which financing with one repayment
date is possible, case 1-K, with a repayment of KD at date T −K (i.e., Q = {T −K}). Analogous
to before, the entrepreneur’s continuation value VT−K+1 = K∆ allows for a maximum incentive-
compatible repayment RT−K = K∆. However, note that at this point the feasibility constraint (5)
also binds, such that moving the repayment forward even further no longer allows the entrepreneur
to increase the promised face value . Therefore, D = ∆ is the maximum amount of outside financing
that can be raised with a single repayment.
Figure 1 summarizes the cases in which financing with only one repayment date is possible
(cases 1-1 to 1-K).





. When the amount of outside financing D exceeds ∆, it is no
longer possible to finance the project with a single repayment because the required repayment would
violate the feasibility condition (5). Therefore, the entrepreneur must now promise repayments at
12
two dates. The optimal way to do this is to move forward the existing repayment date from date
T −K to T −K − 1 and to add a second repayment at date T − 1, resulting in optimal repayment
dates Q = {T − K − 1, T − 1}. Note that once there are two repayment dates, the size of each
repayment is no longer uniquely determined, except when D is at the upper boundary of the interval
(i.e., D = ∆ + ∆
K2
). One possible contract, the slowest way to repay, is to set the final repayment
to the maximum incentive compatible amount, RT−1 = ∆, and to then set RT−K−1 = KD − ∆K .
9












the IC constraint at date
T − 1 is clearly satisfied,
RT−1 = K
2(D −∆) ≤ ∆ = VT .
To check the IC constraint at date T −K − 1, note that, using (1), we can write the continuation
value after date T −K − 1 as




Because RT−1 is incentive compatible, we have VT−K ≥ K∆ ≥ RT−K−1, such that RT−K−1 is
incentive compatible. Intuitively, leaving K periods of cash flow between the two repayment dates
to the entrepreneur makes sure that the repayment of K∆ at date T−K−1 is incentive compatible.
The second repayment at date T − 1 is bounded by ∆, by exactly the same intuition in case 1-1.
Finally, it is also easy to verify that the schedule R with RT−K−1 = K∆ and RT−1 = ∆ attain the
upper bound of D = ∆ + ∆
K2
in this case.
9Alternatively, the fastest way to repay is to set the earlier repayment such that it just satisfies the feasibility
constraint, RT−K−1 = K∆, and set the second repayment to raise the remainder, RT−1 = K
2(D − ∆). As a






, imposing relatively tight bounds on the size of
repayments.
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Figure 2: This figure illustrates the range of outside financing needs for which financing is possible
with two repayment dates, Case 2-1 to Case 2-K.







. As we increase D further, the optimal repayment dates
shift forward to Q = {T−K−2, T−2}. Specifically, compared with case 2-1, both repayment dates
are moved forward by one period. This increases pledgeability at the second (and last) repayment
date, while maintaining incentives to repay at the first repayment date. Similar to case 1-2, the
maximum incentive compatible repayment at T − 2 is VT−1 = 2∆. Keeping K periods between
repayments maintains the incentive compatibility of the first repayment. The debt contract with










. As we continue to increase D, at some point we arrive
at Case 2-K, which is the last case in which the required amount of financing can be raised with
two repayment dates, which occur at dates Q = {T − 2K,T −K}. To raise the maximum amount
of outside financing with two repayment dates, the entrepreneur offers repayments of RT−2K =
RT−K = K∆, which attains the maximum debt value of ∆ +
∆
K , the upper boundary of case 2-K.
At this point, the feasibility condition for both repayments binds. To borrow more, the entrepreneur
has to again increase the number of repayment dates. Cases 2-1 to 2-K are illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 3: This figure illustrates the general case N-j.
Based on the pattern that emerges above, we are now in a position to characterize the general
case N-j, which has N repayments with the final repayment occurring at date T − j. Assume that




















Then the optimal repayment dates are given by Q = {T − (N−1)K−j, T − (N−2)K−j, ..., T −j}
and the maximum feasible and incentive compatible repayments are RT−nK−j = K∆ for all n =














which is equal to the maximum amount of financing that can be raised in case N-j. Case N-j is
illustrated in Figure 3.
2.2 Optimal Debt Structure: General Characterization
Based on case N-j, we can now give a full characterization of the optimal repayment schedule Q.
Proposition 1 In an optimal debt contract, the set of repayment dates is
QN,j ≡ {T − j, T −K − j, T − 2K − j, ..., T − (N − 1)K − j}
15




















which is a partition of all feasible investment amounts when (N, j) is any pair of positive integers
such that
T − 1− (N − 1)K − j ≥ 0.







, the unique optimal debt
repayment schedule is given by
Rt =

K∆, if t ∈ Q\{T − j}
j∆, if t = T − j
0, otherwise.
Proposition 1 characterizes the firm’s optimal debt structure. For a given amount of required
outside financing D, the proposition uniquely characterizes the optimal repayment dates, as well
as the optimal payment amounts at each repayment date at the boundary of each of the intervals
in (8). At the boundaries, the incentive compatibility constraints bind at each of the repayment
dates, such that it is impossible to shift repayments between repayment dates in Q. In between
the boundaries of the intervals in (8), the repayment dates are still uniquely determined, but the
repayment amounts are not uniquely determined. As shown in Lemma 1, the entrepreneur is
then indifferent between all incentive compatible (and feasible) repayment patterns based on the
repayment dates Q.
One key feature of the optimal repayment schedule is that, once the firm starts making re-
payments, these repayments are constantly spaced, separated by K periods to ensure incentive
compatibility. Intuitively, because each additional repayment date adds a discrete amount of addi-
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tional default risk, firms do not smooth their repayments across all periods. Instead, it is optimal to
minimize the number of repayments, subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints.
Denoting by PI(N) the maximum pledgeable income of a debt contract with N ≤ T−1K risky







Intuitively, the maximum the firm can pledge with N repayment dates is N repayments of RT−nK =
K∆, each weighted by the probability of making the nth repayment 1Kn , where n = 1, 2, ..., N .
Therefore, pledgeable income is maximized by offering as many risky repayments as possible.
3 More General Cash-Flow Distributions
In this section, we extend the baseline to more general cash-flow distributions. We proceed as fol-
lows. First, in Section 3.1, we allow for growth in the project’s cash flow. Second, in Section 3.2, we
allow for a risk-free cash-flow component. In contrast to the results, in Section 2, in both of these
cases, pledgeable income is generally no longer maximized by offering as many risky repayments as
possible. Rather, pledgeable income is generally largest under a contract that limits the number
of risky repayment dates to strictly less than the maximum feasible number. The resulting con-
tract then resembles risky long-term debt, in extreme cases with just one risky bullet repayment.
Moreover, firms with risk-free cash-flow component smooth out at least part of their debt structure
by offering safe repayments every period. Finally, in Section 3.3, we discuss continuous cash-flow
distributions and provide a numerical solution for the case in which the period cash flow follows a
lognormal distribution. Under the lognormal distribution, we show that high cash-flow volatility
leads to a lumpy optimal debt structure, where repayments are relatively large and spaced apart.
In contrast, when cash-flow volatility is low, the optimal debt structure is smooth, in the sense that
it features a debt payment in every period once the firm starts making repayments.
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3.1 Cash-Flow Growth
Suppose that the positive cash flow realizations grow at the rate µ > 1. Specifically, at any date
t ∈ T , the cash flow is given by Xt ∈ {Kµt∆, 0}. As in the baseline model, the probability of
receiving a positive cash flow Kµt∆ at date t is 1K , such that the expected cash flow at date t is
µt∆.
This cash-flow distribution differs from the baseline model mainly in that the maximum feasible
repayment now depends on the time when the particular repayment is made. In contrast, in the
baseline model, the maximum feasible repayment K∆ is time-invariant. The specification with
growth in cash flow may be particularly relevant for young firms, growth firms, and other situations
in which the firm’s capacity to produce cash flow increases over time.
Similar to the baseline model, where we assumed thatK is an integer, we now make an analogous
assumption on the pair of (K,µ).





Assumption 1 ensures that it is incentive compatible for the firm to repay the maximum feasible
amount Kµt∆ at t if the next m periods’ cash flows are left to the entrepreneur,
Kµt∆ = µt+1∆ + µt+2∆ + ...+ µt+m∆.
As a result, it is incentive compatible for the entrepreneur to repay Kµt∆ every m periods.
Some of the main insights from the baseline model remain valid with growth in cash flow. As
before, the entrepreneur would like to minimize the number of risky repayments and schedule them
as late as possible, subject to maintaining incentive compatibility. Moreover, once the firm starts
making repayments, these are constantly spaced. The slight difference is that cash-flow growth
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Figure 4: In the presence of cash-flow growth, shifting forward existing repayments and adding an
additional repayment can reduce pledgeable income. Existing repayments that are shifted forward
need to be reduced by the growth factor µ to preserve feasibility. The resultant reduction in the
value of all existing repayments outweighs the extra pledgeable income generated by the additional
repayment (equal to 1
KN
µT∆) when the number of existing repayments N is sufficiently large.
allows risky repayments to be scheduled closer to each other, at intervals of m < K.
Despite these similarities, one key implication of the baseline model changes when we allow for
growth in cash flow. Whereas in the baseline model pledgeable income is maximized by scheduling
as many repayments as possible (recall equation (9)), in the presence of cash-flow growth, increasing
the number of repayments no longer necessarily increases pledgeable income. To see this, note that
the key to increasing pledgeable income by introducing an additional repayment is that the value of
existing repayments, which are shifted forward to accommodate the additional repayment, remains
unchanged. As illustrated in Figure 4, this is no longer the case when there is cash-flow growth.
In particular, when cash flows grow over time, positive cash-flow realizations are smaller in earlier
periods, such that existing repayments have to be scaled down when they are shifted forward.
Therefore, whether adding an additional repayment increases pledgeable income depends on which
effect dominates, the decrease in the value of existing repayments that are being shifted forward or
the value of the additional repayment that is added at the end.
When the number of existing repayments N is large, the reduction in expected repayments
from the first N repayment dates dominates: Shifting forward the existing N repayments by one
period reduces their values by the growth factor µ. On the other hand, the value of the additional
19
Figure 5: When there is growth in cash flow, pledgeable income is generally maximized with a fixed
number of N∗ repayments towards the end of the project.
repayment (e.g. µT∆ at date T−1 in Figure 4) is weighted by the probability that the firm survives
past the first N repayments, 1
KN
, and therefore becomes arbitrarily small when N is large. As a
result, for large N a further increase in the number of repayments decreases pledgeable income.
Pledgeability is then maximized with N∗ repayments, where N∗ > 0 is given by the smallest integer




)j+ 1 < 0. (11)
Because µ > 1 and Kµ−m > 1 (by the definition of m above), N∗ is well defined and unique.
Importantly, N∗ is independent of T . Therefore, even when asset maturity and, therefore, the
number of possible repayment dates T grows large, pledgeability continues to be maximized with
a fixed number of N∗ repayments, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Proposition 2 In the model with growing cash flows (µ > 1),
1. the pledgeable income with N repayments PI(N) is maximized at N∗ for any T sufficiently
large;







3. for any N ≤ N∗, if D ∈ (PI(N − 1), P I(N)], the optimal debt contract has N repayment
dates and has the first repayment date t1 ≥ T −Nm;
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4. for any N ≤ N∗, if D = PI(N), there is a unique optimal debt contract characterized by
Rt =

µtK∆, if t ∈ {T −m,T − 2m, ..., T −Nm}
0, otherwise.
A key implication of Proposition 2 is that for some firms it may never be optimal to schedule
more than one repayment.
Corollary 1 When 1 > 1K + µ
−m, the maximum number of repayment dates N∗ is 1.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we see that, in the presence of cash-flow growth, the optimal
debt contract resembles long-term debt. Independent of the project’s horizon T , all repayments
occur in the final N∗m periods. In particular, as T becomes large, the earliest possible repayment




The finding that long-term debt can maximize pledgeability puts an interesting twist on our
understanding of the role of short-term debt in increasing pledgeability via a termination threat. In
two period models, for the threat of termination to be credible, debt essentially has to be short-term,
one-period debt. When many repayment dates are possible, on the other hand, it is possible that
the debt maturity that maximizes pledgeability roughly matches the project’s horizon, especially
when T is large. Depending on parameters, our model can therefore capture both, incentives to
finance with short average maturities (leading to maturity mismatch) and incentives to finance with
longer term debt (approximate matching of the maturities of assets and liabilities).
3.2 A Risk-Free Cash-Flow Component
In this section, we extend the model to allow for a risk-free cash-flow component L. Specifically,
we assume that the cash-flow distribution Xt is binary with a high cash flow of L + K∆ with
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Figure 6: When L ≥ ∆K−1 , pledgeable income is maximized by making a risk-free repayment of L
every period.
probability 1K and a low cash flow of L > 0 with complementary probability. The average per-
period cash flow is therefore ∆+L. We assume that L is subject to the same enforceability issues as
the risky cash-flow component (i.e., also repayments from the risk-free cash-flow component need
to be incentive compatible).
Obviously, if D ≤ (T − 1)L, the optimal debt structure is to repay by risk-free cash flows up to
L at every t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}. One can also easily verify that any risk-free repayment profile is
indeed incentive compatible. More generally, Proposition 3 shows that when the risk-free cash-flow
component is sufficiently large, it is never optimal to use risky debt, and pledgeable income is





then the risk-free schedule Rt = L for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1} maximizes pledgeable income.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. The benefit of increasing repayments beyond
the risk-free level is that the entrepreneur pays back more when the high cash flow is realized, which
improves pledgeable income. However, this risky repayment also generates default risk, which hurts
the expected value of the current as well as all subsequently scheduled repayments. Therefore, risky
repayments are never optimal when the loss of a risk-free repayment of L is larger than the expected
gain of adding a risky repayment ∆+LK , as implied by condition (12). Note that condition (12) is
more likely to hold when cash-flow risk is large (high K). When default risk is higher, risk-free
debt is more likely to be optimal.
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For the remainder of this section, we assume (12) does not hold, in order to focus on the case
in which introducing risky repayments can increase pledgeability. As in the case with cash-flow
growth analyzed in Section 3.1, some of the baseline results continue to hold. Specifically, all
risky repayments continue to be scheduled towards the end of the project. In addition, in order
to minimize the number of risky repayments, every risky repayment is set to the entire high cash
flow realization of K∆ + L, and risky repayments are spaced K periods apart. However, similar
to the case with cash-flow growth, we again find that pledgeable income is maximized by limiting
the number of risky repayments, in this case to N∗∗ > 0, where N∗∗ is the smallest integer for





Proposition 4 In the presence of a risk-free cash-flow component L,
1. the pledgeable income PI(N) is maximized with N∗∗ repayment dates for any T sufficiently
large;
2. for any N ≤ N∗∗,






3. for any N ≤ N∗∗, if D ∈ (PI(N − 1), P I(N)], the optimal debt contract has N repayment
dates, and the first risky repayment will be made at date t1 ≥ T −NK;




K∆ + L, if t ∈ {T −K,T − 2K, ..., T −NK}
L otherwise.
Part 3 of Proposition 4 shows that in the presence of a risk-free cash-flow component, schedul-
ing as many risky repayments as possible does not generally maximize pledgeability. While this
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Figure 7: When L < ∆K−1 , pledgeability is maximized by limiting the number of risky repayment
dates to N∗∗. Risky repayments are scheduled towards the end of the project and spaced K periods
apart.
result is similar to the case with cash-flow growth, the intuition for limiting the number of risky
repayments is slightly different. As the entrepreneur moves the repayment schedule forward by
one period to increase risky repayments, she sacrifices one period with a risk-free repayment of L.
The contribution to the firm’s pledgeable income from the final risky repayment is weighted by
the probability of making this repayment 1
KN
(if there are N risky repayments). Therefore as N
becomes very large, the benefit from the last risky repayment diminishes exponentially, and the
cost of sacrificing a risk-free repayment of L dominates.
Part 4 of Proposition 4 shows that a risk-free cash-flow component leads to incentives to partially
smooth repayments over time. While the firm continues to only offer periodic risky repayments (if
any), the firm pays out the risk-free cash-flow component L every period.
3.3 Continuous Cash-Flow Distributions
In this section, we relax the assumption of a binary period cash-flow distribution and extend
our analysis to continuous distributions. The analysis demonstrates that the firm’s optimal debt
structure continues to be determined by the economic trade-off highlighted by the baseline model
of Section 2 and the extension to a risk-free cash-flow component in Section 3.2. In particular, we
show that when the cash-flow distribution is lognormal, high cash-flow volatility leads to a lumpy
optimal debt structure, under which repayments are relatively large and spaced apart. In contrast,
when cash-flow volatility is low, the optimal debt structure is smooth, in the sense that it features
a relatively small debt payment in every period once the firm starts making repayments.
Because of the additional complexity of dealing with continuous distributions in our multi-
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period setup, most of the analysis is this section is numerical. However, before proceeding to the
numerical analysis, we analytically establish a necessary condition on the distribution from which
period cash flows are drawn, such that lumpy repayment profiles can become optimal. As in the
baseline model, we assume that period cash flows are independent and identically distributed (IID).
Define the single-period pledgeability-maximizing face value as
R ≡ arg max
R
P (Xt ≥ R)R.
This face value maximizes the amount raised by a single repayment (assuming this payment is
incentive compatible). Clearly, there is no reason for the firm to ever offer a repayment that
exceeds R, because any repayment Rt > R raises less financing but results in higher default risk
than a repayment of R. Therefore, if R is smaller than the expected cash flow in the next period,
R ≤ E(Xt), (13)
then the incentive compatibility constraint is trivially satisfied in every period, without the need
to space out repayments over multiple periods. In this case, the optimal debt structure is smooth:
Once repayments start, they occur every period. Moreover, the optimal repayment profile is gradu-
ally increasing; earlier repayments are smaller in order to reduce default risk in early periods when
defaulting is particularly costly.
If condition (13) is violated, such that R > E(Xt), then, as in the baseline model, it can be
optimal for the entrepreneur to offer relatively large repayments Rt ∈ (E(Xt), R]. These larger
repayments must be separated by smaller or zero repayments in order to preserve the borrower’s
incentive to repay. As the following numerical analysis shows, the lumpy debt structure of the
baseline model then emerges when the period cash flow has sufficient upside, whereas smoothing
of debt repayments is optimal when the upside in the period cash flow is limited.
For our numerical analysis, we assume that period cash flows follow an IID lognormal distribu-
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tion.10 Throughout the analysis, we normalize the mean of the periodic cash flow to E(Xt) = 1.
11
For our numerical calculations, we discretize the distribution of the cashflow Xt and the repayments
Rt at intervals of 0.1 and then use a numerical algorithm to solve for the optimal debt structure
for different amounts of required outside financing in a setting with eleven periods (T = 11). A
detailed description of the algorithm is given in Appendix B.
Figure 8 shows optimal debt structures for different outside financing needs when the period
cash flow has relatively high volatility, matching the 90th percentile of asset volatility documented
in Frank and Goyal (2009) (corresponding to an asset volatility of 62%).12 In this case, the period
cash-flow distribution has significant upside. As in the baseline model, the optimal debt structure
emerges from the back: When only a small amount of financing has to be raised, the firm offers one
repayment at the penultimate date (top left panel). As the outside financing need increases, more
repayment dates are added, and are often spaced two periods apart. Pledgeability is maximized
with six repayments at dates 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10 (bottom right panel.) Figure 9, in contrast, shows
the optimal debt structure when the period cash flow has relatively low volatility, matching the
90th percentile of asset volatility documented in Frank and Goyal (2009) (corresponding to an asset
volatility of 3%).13 In this case, there is limited upside in the period cash-flow distribution, but
overall the cash flow is relatively safe. Again, the optimal debt structure emerges from the back as
the required amount of outside financing increases, but in this case it is smooth: Once repayments
start, they occur in every period except the last one (in which no repayment can be extracted).
The larger the financing need, the more and larger repayments are offered. The pledgeability-
maximizing debt structure (bottom right panel) features a repayment in every period, except at
10The lognormal cash-flow distribution is attractive because it is the workhorse distribution in many structural
corporate finance models. It guarantees a strictly positive, unbounded cash flow.









12Asset volatility is calculated as the return volatility of the period cash flow relative to date-0 unlevered firm value
T ∗E(X). Following this calculation, an asset volatility of 62% corresponds to a volatility parameter for the underlying












13Following the same calculation as before, an asset volatility of 3% corresponds to a volatility parameter for the
underlying normal distribution of σ = 0.3216.
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Figure 8: Lumpy debt structure with lognormal cash flow. This figure shows the optimal
debt structure for different amounts of outside financing when the period cash flow follows a lognor-
mal distribution with 62% asset volatility, corresponding to the 90th percentile in Frank and Goyal
(2009). The top left panel shows the optimal eleven-period debt structure when the amount raised
is equal to the maximum that could be raised with just two periods (D = D2). In the remaining
panels, the amount of outside financing is then increased to the maximum that could be raised
with 6, 8, and 11 periods (denoted by D6, D8, and D11, respectively). The bottom right panel
therefore corresponds to the pledgeability-maximizing debt structure with 11 cash-flow dates.
the final date.
Therefore, when the period cash flow is sufficiently volatile, under a lognormal cash-flow dis-
tribution the optimal debt structure features spacing that is similar to the baseline model (Propo-
sition 1) and the model with significant risky cash-flow component (Proposition 4). In contrast,
when cash-flow volatility is relatively low, then under the lognormal distribution the optimal debt
structure features smoothing, similar to the case with a significant risk-free cash-flow component
(Proposition 3), where the upside from offering a higher face value is limited.
27
Figure 9: Smooth debt structure with lognormal cash flow. This figure shows the optimal
debt structure for different amounts of outside financing when the period cash flow follows a lognor-
mal distribution with 3% asset volatility, corresponding to the 10th percentile in Frank and Goyal
(2009). The top left panel shows the optimal eleven-period debt structure when the amount raised
is equal to the maximum that could be raised with just two periods (D = D2). In the remaining
panels, the amount of outside financing is then increased to the maximum that could be raised
with 6, 8, and 11 periods (denoted by D6, D8, and D11, respectively). The bottom right panel
therefore corresponds to the pledgeability-maximizing debt structure with 11 cash-flow dates.
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4 Empirical Implications
In this section, we discuss the key empirical implications of our model. We first link our results to
the empirical literature on debt maturity, which has mainly focused on the average maturities of
firms’ debt liabilities. We then turn to the more recent literature that has examined the granularity
of corporate debt (i.e., how firms spread maturity dates over time). Our model, which provides a
unified framework to study debt maturity and debt dispersion from first principles, matches the
key empirical findings of these two literatures.
4.1 Average Maturity
In our model, the expected average repayment time under the optimal debt contract, taking into




Kt . This measure is similar to classic
measures of duration, in that it weights different repayments dates by the present values of the
corresponding repayments. One slight complication is that, as shown in Proposition 1, the exact
repayment amounts at each repayment date, and therefore the average repayment time, are not
pinned down uniquely except at the point where the debt structure maximizes pledgeable income
for a given number of repayment dates.14 For expositional purposes, we therefore focus on the
longest average repayment time, which is achieved by backloading repayments as much as possible.
The results for the shortest average repayment time are similar, with very minor modifications.15
Lemma 2 Given any sustainable amount D of outside financing, the longest average repayment
time is attained by maximally backloading repayments, Rti = K∆ for all 2 ≤ i ≤ N −1, RtN = j∆,
14Repayment dates are uniquely determined, but except at the boundaries between cases there are a number of
repayment amount schedules that raise the required amount of outside financing.
15As an alternative to our duration measure, one could simply calculate the average scheduled repayment time, not




. Focusing on the most backloaded contract, the comparative statics
under this alternative definition are qualitatively the same as those under the measure that adjusts for default risk.
We use the default-risk adjusted measure, because it is closer to standard measures of duration, which also adjust for
default through the yield. Moreover, the proofs are simpler when adjusting for default risk.
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), and can be written as













In addition to characterizing average repayment times, our model also makes predictions about
the number and spacing of repayments. These predictions, which we also point to in the predictions
laid out below, are, to the best of our knowledge, largely untested.
4.1.1 Cash-Flow Risk
Our first set of empirical predictions relates to the riskiness of cash flows, which in our model
is captured by the parameter K. The effect of cash-flow risk on the optimal debt structure is
an immediate corollary of Proposition 1: When cash flow becomes riskier, the repayment profile
consists of larger promised repayments (K∆) and longer time intervals (K) between two repayment
dates. In addition, maximum pledgeable income with N repayments PI(N) is decreasing in cash-
flow risk. As a result, to raise the same amount of outside financing, a firm with riskier cash
flows needs to spread its debt repayments across more repayment dates. Combined with the longer
intervals between repayments, this implies that the entire repayment profile of the optimal debt
contract extends forward. Consequently, the average repayment time decreases.
Prediction 1 (Cash-Flow Risk and Average Maturity) As cash-flow risk K increases, hold-
ing all other parameters constant, the number of repayments N weakly increases; the time between
two repayments increases; and the average repayment time decreases.
The prediction that cash-flow risk is associated with earlier average repayment has broad support
in the empirical literature on debt maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that riskier firms (as
measured by lower EBITDA volatility) have shorter maturity debt. Barclay and Smith (1995)
document that higher volatility of asset returns (implied from equity returns) correlates negatively
with the fraction of debt that matures in more than three years. Guedes and Opler (1996) document
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that higher industry volatility of ROA growth is negatively correlated with the maturity of newly
issued debt. Custódio et al. (2013) document that debt maturity correlates negatively with asset
volatility.
4.1.2 Profitability
Second, we examine the effect of profitability on the average repayment time. The expected period
cash flow ∆ is a natural measure of profitability. However, given the binary cash-flow structure, a
change in ∆ also affects the variance of the period cash flow, ∆2 (K − 1). To analyze the marginal
effect of higher profitability, we therefore increase ∆ while holding cash-flow variance constant by
reducing K. This reduction in K implies that the comparative static with respect to profitability is
the inverse of Prediction 1: The debt profile of a more profitable company features fewer repayments
and shorter intervals between repayment dates, concentrated towards the end of the project’s life.
The average repayment time is therefore longer.
Prediction 2 (Profitability and Average Maturity) As the expected period cash flow ∆ in-
creases, holding cash-flow variance ∆2 (K − 1) and all other parameters constant, the number of
repayments weakly decreases, the time between risky repayments decreases, and the average repay-
ment time increases.
The prediction that higher profitability is associated with more backloaded repayments is con-
sistent with the evidence that profitability is generally associated with longer debt maturity. For
example, Qian and Strahan (2007) find that more profitable firms (as measured by net income di-
vided by assets) borrow longer-term. Similarly, Guedes and Opler (1996) show that less profitable
firms (as measured by larger operating loss carry-forwards) tend to issue debt of shorter maturity,




Finally, we analyze the effect of leverage. The easiest way to analyze higher leverage in our model
is through a reduction of the firm’s cash resources c. Less cash at hand directly translates into a
higher required amount of outside financing D = I − c, while leaving the expected cash flows of
the firm’s project unchanged. From Proposition 1 we know that the entrepreneur can increase the
amount of financing raised in three ways: (i) by increasing promised repayments within a given
case N − j; (ii) by moving existing repayment dates forward (an increase in j); and (iii) by adding
more repayment dates (an increase in N). In the latter two scenarios, the optimal debt contract
clearly becomes more short-term, in the sense that the average repayment time of the optimal debt
contract decreases. However, even in the first case, in which the entrepreneur simply raises face
values for a given set of repayment dates (i.e., within a given case N − j), the average repayment
time decreases. This is because repayments are maximally backloaded, so that higher D increases
the first repayment, which reduces the average repayment time.
Prediction 3 (Leverage and Average Maturity) Holding all other parameters constant, an
increase in leverage (higher D) weakly increases the number of repayments N and decreases the
average repayment time.
Empirically, our model therefore predicts that the debt structures of highly levered firms are
more front-loaded, with more repayment dates. As a result, high leverage is predicted to be
associated with shorter debt duration. This finding is consistent with the evidence on the debt
structure of leveraged buyout deals in Axelson et al. (2013), who document that repayment profiles
of buyout deals are more frontloaded during times when deals are highly levered. Similarly, Billett
et al. (2007) document that the proportion of short-term debt increases with firms’ leverage.16
16Interestingly, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) document a positive correlation between
leverage and debt maturity. Relative to Axelson et al. (2013), the reason for this difference may be that buyouts,
where the entire repayment structure is optimized at the time of the deal, more closely correspond to the setting in
our paper than looking at snapshots of the average maturity of a firm’s existing debt.
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4.2 Debt Granularity
In a series of recent papers, Choi et al. (2017a,b) have investigated the granularity of corporate
debt. The key object of interest in this literature is the choice between “granular” (or “dispersed”)
maturity structures (repayments are spread out over time) and “concentrated” maturity structures
(with repayments clustered at, say, one or two dates). Our model provides a novel angle to this
literature by generating predictions for debt granularity from first principles, based on the same
incomplete contracting friction that underpins many of the leading theories of debt financing.
In defining debt granularity, we follow Choi et al. (2017a,b), who employ two measures: (i)
the inverse of the Herfindahl index of a firm’s debt issues and (ii) the squared distance between a
firm’s maturity profile and a perfectly dispersed maturity profile with equal fractions of face value
maturing each date. Based on both of these measures, our model makes the following predictions.
Prediction 4 (Debt Granularity) The granularity of the optimal debt contract
1. increases with cash-flow risk K, particularly for high-leverage firms;
2. is higher, the larger the risk-free cash-flow component L;
3. is higher for firms with high leverage D;
4. is higher for less profitable firms.
These predictions are consistent with the evidence in Choi et al. (2017a,b). First, Choi et al.
(2017a) show that higher rollover risk after the Ford/GM downgrade in 2005 led to more dispersed
new debt issuance, particularly for high-leverage firms. Consistent with this finding, in our model
higher K, which increases the likelihood for the firm of not being able to make a given debt
repayment, leads to a debt structure with more repayment dates N and therefore higher debt
granularity.17 Moreover, our model predicts that the increase in debt dispersion is particularly
17For example, denoting the fraction of face value due at date t by wt, the squared deviation from the perfectly
smooth maturity structure can be written as D2 = −log
∑T
i=1(wt − 1/T )
2 = −log(1/N − 1/T ), which is increasing
in the number of repayment dates N .
33
large for highly-levered firms for which the number of repayment dates is particularly sensitive to
cash-flow risk K.18 Moreover, Choi et al. (2017b) document a positive association between profit
volatility and debt granularity. They also show that mature firms have more dispersed maturity
structures, consistent with the model’s prediction that firms spread out the repayments based on
the safe cash-flow component L, and firms with higher leverage and lower profitability have more
dispersed debt structures, consistent with the final two predictions. Finally, while Choi et al.
(2017a,b) mostly focus on the granularity of a firm’s entire stock of existing debt, Norden et al.
(2016) document similar patterns for new debt issuances.
5 Extensions
5.1 Savings
In the baseline model, we assumed for simplicity that the entrepreneur can only use contempo-
raneous cash flow to make repayments. In this section, we show that the optimal debt structure
derived in the baseline model (repayments of K∆ spaced K periods apart once repayments start
and, potentially, a smaller final repayment of j∆ at date T − j with j ≤ K) remains pledgeability
maximizing when the entrepreneur can save. This is a general result, but for expositional purposes
we illustrate the inuition through an example rather than providing a full formal treatment.
As in the baseline model, we assume that the firm raises an amount D to finance the project
at date 0. The main difference relative to the baseline model is that, when saving is possible,
the entrepreneur can use cash flow from previous periods to make repayments. This has two key
implications. First, savings allow the entrepreneur to potentially make payments that exceed the
period cash flow (i.e., Rt > K∆ does not necessarily violate the feasibility condition). However, as
we show below, it is never optimal to offer repayments that exceed K∆. Second, savings introduce a
non-trivial trade-off between repayment timing and default risk. Specifically, when the entrepreneur
18However, note that in our model the firm does not, in fact, reduce rollover risk by offering more repayment dates.
Rather, to raise the same amount of outside financing in the presence of higher cash-flow risk, firms have to offer
more repayments because each individual repayment is less likely to be made.
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can save, it can be optimal to delay the first repayment in order to allow the firm to accumulate
cash. Therefore, relative to the baseline model, the pledgeability-maximizing debt structure may
feature fewer (but less risky) repayments. Nevertheless, the general form of the optimal debt
structure derived in the baseline model remains pledgeability maximizing when the entrepreneur
can save.
We first show that it is never optimal to offer repayments that exceed K∆, even though the
ability to save makes such repayments feasible in principle. For the sake of example, consider a larger
repayment of Rt = 2K∆. Suppose that this is the last repayment, such that incentive compatibility
requires that this repayment must occur on or before date T − 2K. Now consider splitting up this
single repayment of 2K∆ into two separate repayments of K∆ at dates T − 2K and T −K. It is
easy to see that this new schedule is also incentive compatible. More importantly, though, splitting
the repayment strictly improves the payoff to the entrepreneur. For any realization of cash flows,
if the entrepreneur can repay 2K∆ at date T − 2K, she can also make the two repayments of
K∆ under the new schedule. But the new schedule allows the entrepreneur strictly more time to
repay the second K∆, thereby reducing the probability of liquidation. By the same logic, any debt
contract that features individual repayments that exceed K∆ can be improved upon.
Proposition 5 In the optimal debt contract with savings, any individual repayment Rt is weakly
smaller than K∆.
We now discuss why the general shape of the optimal debt structure derived in the baseline
model remains pledgeability maximizing even when the entrepreneur can save. The intuition is
similar to the baseline model. First, in order to maximize pledgeability, the incentive constraint
must be binding at every repayment date. Second, to minimize default costs, it is optimal to
backload repayments as much as possible. Together with the result that even in the presence of
savings all repayments are bounded by K∆, these two conditions lead to a debt structure with
initial repayments of K∆ every K periods once repayments start, and a final repayment of j∆ at
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date T − j.19 Therefore, even though the ability to save significantly reduces default and increases
pledgeable income, the pledgeability-maximizing debt structure is analogous to that in the baseline
model.
The main difference to the baseline model is that in the presence of savings it is no longer
necessarily pledgeability maximizing to offer as many repayments as possible. The reason is that
it can be optimal to allow the borrower to save cash flow for some periods in order to make future
repayments safer and, therefore, more valuable. Intuitively, relative to the baseline model moving
repayments forward has an additional cost because it reduces the ability to build up a cash buffer
stock. To see the intuition for this result, consider the following example.
Example 1: Suppose that the firm’s project lasts for five dates t = 1, . . . , 5, and at each
date t, the potential cash flow Xt is either 2∆ or 0 with equal probability (i.e., K = 2). In the
baseline model without savings the pledgeability maximizing contract is {2∆, 0, 2∆, 0, 0}. Under















∗ 2∆ = 3
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∆.
When the entrepreneur can save, the probability of making the second repayment increases. Con-
ditional on making the first repayment, the second repayment of 2∆ is made if X2 or X3 (or both)


















However, the entrepreneur can increase pledgeability even further by postponing the first repayment
19Using the recursive formulation of equation (1) and backward induction, one can verify that the entrepreneur’s
continuation value on any repayment date t is Vt = ∆ + Pr(no default)(−Rt + Vt+1) = ∆ whenever the incentive
constraint binds (Rt = Vt+1). Therefore, on repayment dates, the continuation value Vt is exactly the same as in
the baseline model, even though the ability to save leads to a significant reduction in the default probability. It then
follows from backward induction that also on non-repayment dates the entrepreneur’s continuation value is the same
as in the baseline model.
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and reducing the second repayment to preserve incentive compatibility: {0, 2∆, 0,∆, 0}, which,
as one can easily check, is the pledgeability-maximizing contract. Under this contract, the first







= 34 . The second repayment of ∆ is made
with certainty if both X1 = X2 = 2∆ (with probability
1
4) . If only one of X1 and X2 is positive
(with probability 12), making the second repayment requires a positive cash flow in X3 or X4, which
happens with probability 34 . The value of this debt contract is therefore
3
4












Hence, while the pledgeability-maximizing debt structure has the same structure as in the baseline
model, it is shifted backwards so that the firm can build up a cash buffer.
Finally, note that, even though the optimal debt structure of the baseline model remains pledge-
ability maximizing, the ability to save cash flow generally allows for multiple ways to implement a
given pledgeable income. In particular, in the presence of a savings technology one can usually split
the repayments of K∆ into smaller repayments that are spread out over K periods. In the previous
example, the repayment profiles {0, 2∆, 0,∆, 0} and {0,∆,∆,∆, 0} are equivalent because, if the
entrepreneur can repay 2∆ at date 2 in the first contract, she can make two payments of ∆ at dates
2 and 3 in the second contract. Conversely, if the entrepreneur can make the first repayment of ∆
in the second contract, she has received at least one cash-flow realization of 2∆, so that she could
also make a repayment of 2∆ that would be required under the first contract. However, a small
repayment cost or an imperfection in the savings technology would restore unique optimality of the
debt structure derived in the baseline model.
5.2 Refinancing
In this section, we present an extended version of the baseline model in which the entrepreneur can
refinance the outstanding debt at any point before the end of the project’s life. The main result of
this section is that, without loss of generality, we can focus on contracts under which the firm is
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liquidated the first time it receives a zero cash flow on a scheduled repayment date (i.e., as in the
baseline model).
Unlike the ability to save, which allows the entrepreneur to use cash flow from previous periods,
refinancing enables the entrepreneur to use (unpledged) future cash flow to make a repayment
today. To capture this feature, denote by Rs = {(Rst , Bst )|t > s} the debt contract signed at date
s, which specifies a schedule of repayments Rst to be paid at dates t > s and a schedule of lump
sum refinancing payments Bst that must be paid to creditors in case the debt contract is terminated
early (i.e., Bst is the call price of all debt outstanding at date t). We use the convention B
s
t = ∞
to indicate instances when the contract signed at date s does not allow for refinancing at date t.
Using the notation introduced above, the initial contract signed at date 0, R0, is a schedule
of repayment amounts and call prices {(R0t , B0t )|t > 0}. Subsequently, at each date t, the cash
flow Xt ∈ {0,K∆} is realized. If the borrower repays R0t , the contract continues on to date t+ 1.
Alternatively, the borrower can choose to terminate the current contract by paying B0t . If the cash
flow Xt alone is insufficient to pay B
0
t , the borrower can refinance the remainder B
0
t −Xt by issuing
a new contract Rt. Denoting by D(Rt) the value of the refinancing contract Rt, taking into account
all possible refinancing in the future, successful refinancing therefore requires that D(Rt) = B0t −Xt.
We assume that, at date 0, the entrepreneur can commit to a (grand) refinancing plan {Rs|s ≥ 1},
with each refinancing contract Rs depending on the history of publicly observable variables (i.e.,
previous contracts and refinancing decisions).20
Relative to the baseline model, one possibility that arises in the presence of refinancing is that
the firm may be able to survive a period with a positive scheduled repayment Rst > 0 and a zero
cash-flow realization Xt = 0 by refinancing to a new contract Rt that satisfies D(Rt) = Bst . We
will refer to such a repayment as a refinanceable repayment, because a zero cash-flow realization
on the repayment date no longer leads to termination. The main result of this section is that,
20The assumption that a grand refinancing contract is signed at date 0 is not crucial. However, it greatly simplifies
the analysis because it means that we do not have to deal with beliefs about future refinancing contracts and possible
deviations.
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without loss of generality, we can focus on contracts without such refinanceable repayments. Under
a contract without refinanceable repayments, the firm is liquidated the first time it has a zero
cash-flow realization on a repayment date, as is the case in the baseline model.
The intuition behind this result is that, for any refinancing plan with refinanceable repay-
ments, we can construct an equivalent plan without refinanceable repayments. The key step in the
construction is to eliminate the refinanceable repayment and to replace the original continuation
contract following the refinanceable repayment by the refinancing contract starting at that date.
To illustrate this in the simplest possible way, we return to the five-period example from Section
5.1. However, the reasoning of the example applies more generally.
Example 2: Suppose that the entrepreneur’s initial borrowing is D = ∆. Consider first
an initial contract and associated refinancing plan {R} with an initial repayment profile R0 =
{0,∆, 0, 0, 0} and B0 = {∞,∆,∞,∞,∞}. The first repayment R02 = ∆ is a refinanceable repay-
ment because, even if X2 = 0, the entrepreneur can repay ∆ by refinancing to a new contract R2
with R2 = {2∆, 0, 0} and B2 = {∞,∞,∞}. Note that, under this new contract, the entrepreneur
cannot refinance again if X3 = 0. As a result, the value of the refinancing contract entered at date
2, R2, is 12 ∗ 2∆ = ∆, which is sufficient to raise B
0
2 = ∆.
Next, we construct an equivalent refinancing plan {R̃} without the refinanceable repayment
R02. The key insight is that the refinancing contract R2 now replaces the initial contract starting
from date 3, i.e., R̃0 = {0, 0, R2} = {0, 0, 2∆, 0, 0} and B̃0t = B2t for t ≥ 3. Intuitively, if a
payment is refinanceable in the original contract, we simply use the refinancing contract as part
of the original contract. In addition, the refinanceable repayment (R02 = ∆) is replaced by a zero
promised repayment and an option to prepay R02 = ∆, i.e., B̃
0 ≡ {B01 , R02, B2} = {∞,∆,∞,∞,∞}.
The option to refinance at date 2 is only taken when cash flow X2 = 2∆.
21 Under this refinancing
21In general, for a refinanceable repayment R0t , the new refinancing payment B̃
0
t should be the original repayment
plus the continuation value of the original contract starting from date t+ 1, i.e. B̃0t = R
0
t +Dt+1(R0). The contract
R̃t to refinance the difference Dt+1(R0) = B̃0t −R0t is simply the original contract R0 starting from date t+ 1. Note,
in the example, the continuation contract R0 starting from date 3 is {0, 0, 0}, so the entrepreneur can pay B̃02 using
cash flow X2 = 2∆ without issuing a refinancing contract R̃
2.
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plan, if X2 = 2∆, the entrepreneur will refinance and thereby effectively prepay B̃
0
2 = ∆ to
finish required repayments. Note that this is the same effective repayment pattern as under {R}
where, if X2 = 2∆, the entrepreneur repays R
0
2 = ∆. On the other hand, if X2 = 0, under {R} the
entrepreneur refinances, whereas under {R̃} the entrepreneur simply continues the ongoing contract
and makes a payment of R̃03 = 2∆ at date 3 if X3 = 2∆ (and defaults if X3 = 0). The effective
repayment streams are exactly the same, so that {R̃}, which does not include any refinanceable
repayments, is equivalent to {R}, the contract with refinanceable repayments.
Under the plan without refinanceable repayment, {R̃}, the key additional incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is the manager’s willingness to refinance at date 2 if a positive cash flow X2 = 2∆ is re-
alized. If the manager chooses not to refinance and consume X2, his payoff isX2+E(X3−R̃03+Ṽ 04 ) =
2∆ + 12(2∆− 2∆ + 2∆) = 3∆. This is strictly less than the payoff under refinancing, which is given
by X2− B̃02 +E(X3) +E(X4) +E(X5) = 2∆−∆ + 3∆ = 4∆. Hence, if X2 = 2∆ the manager will
refinance at date 2, as specified in the equilibrium strategy.
5.3 Equivalence between Refinancing and Savings
Focusing on the debt contract without refinanceable repayments is also helpful in establishing a
close parallel between refinancing and savings. Under this contract, refinancing is a way for the
entrepreneur to prepay in high cash-flow states that do not feature a contractual repayment. Given
this, it becomes intuitive that the same outcome can be achieved by saving early cash flows (or
paying them into and escrow account or sinking fund). In fact, as we illustrate below, the maximum
pledgeable income is the same under savings and refinancing. This result implies that the structure
of the optimal contract in the baseline model (repayments of K∆ spaced K periods apart and,
potentially, a smaller final repayment of j∆ at date T − j with j ≤ K) remains pledgeability
maximizing even when refinancing is possible.
To show this, we return to the five-period example from Section 5.1 and characterize the
pledgeability-maximizing repayment profile under refinancing.
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Example 3: Consider an initial contract R0 that consists of the promised repayment scheme
R0 = {0, 2∆, 0,∆, 0} and the early termination amounts B0 = {238 ∆,∞,∆,∞,∞}. (Note that
refinancing is impossible at dates 2, 4, and 5 because B = ∞. Therefore, if the entrepreneur
misses the repayment at those dates, the project will be terminated.) At date 1, if X1 = 0,
the entrepreneur will continue R0, whereas if X1 = 2∆, the entrepreneur will terminate R0 by
prepaying 2∆ and refinancing 78∆ by issuing a new contract R
1 with R1 = {0, 0,∆, 0} and B1 =
{∆,∆,∞,∞}. Intuitively, R1 requires the entrepreneur to make a payment of ∆ at date 4, but
allows for prepayment of this amount at dates 2 and 3.
We are now in a position to calculate the value of the above refinancing plan. Suppose first that
X1 = 0. If also X2 = 0, then the project is terminated and the creditor receives 0. If X2 = 2∆,
then the entrepreneur pays R02 = 2∆ and then has two more chances to pay an additional ∆, either
by prepaying B03 = ∆ or repaying R
0





















Now suppose that X1 = 2∆. In this case, the entrepreneur will repay 2∆ using the current cash
flow and refinance 238 ∆− 2∆ =
7
8∆ by issuing R
1. R1 raises 78∆ by giving the entrepreneur three
chances to repay the remaining face value ∆, either by prepaying B12 or B
1
3 or by making the







∆ = 78∆ and therefore raises exactly the
amount required for refinancing. Conditional on X1 = 2∆, the expected payoff to the creditor
(including the value of the repayment and the refinancing contract) is therefore 2∆ + 78∆ =
23
8 ∆.














This (pledgeability-maximizing) refinancing contract therefore achieves the same pledgeable income
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as the pledgeability-maximizing contract under savings.22 Moreover, note that the structure of the
individual repayment profiles R0 and R1 mirrors the optimal repayment profile derived in the
baseline model (periodic repayments of K∆ spaced K periods apart and, potentially, a smaller
final repayment of j∆ at date T − j with j ≤ K).23 Of course, because the ability to refinance
reduces the incidence of default on the equilibrium path, generally fewer repayments are required
to finance the same amount D than under the optimal contract in the baseline model.
5.4 Discounting
In this section, we briefly discuss how the introduction of time discounting affects our results. We
first discuss introducing a common discount rate and then turn to the case in which the entrepreneur
discounts the future more than creditors.
Common discount rate: The simplest (perhaps obvious) case is when the entrepreneur and
creditors have a common discount factor β < 1 and cash flows grow at the common discount rate
(i.e., the high cash-flow realization on date t is given by β−tK∆). In this case, all results carry
over analogously to the baseline model. This is because this case boils down to a simple rescaling
of variables, where the rescaled variables are defined as R̃t = β
−tRt and X̃t = β
−tXt. Scheduled
repayments will be increasing over time, given that the feasibility constraint is now Rt ≤ β−tK∆.
Repayments continue to be spaced K periods apart as in the model without discounting. To see
this, note that if we leave K periods until next payment, then entrepreneur receives
ββ−t−1∆ + β2β−t−2∆ + · · ·+ βKβ−t−K∆ = β−tK∆,
which makes the highest feasible date-t repayment Rt = β
−tK∆ just incentive compatible.
Things are more interesting when there is a common discount rate but cash flows are constant
22Incentive compatilibity of the pledgeability-maximizing refinancing contract can be checked in similar fashion to
Example 2 above. We omit the details for brevity.
23The equivalence between refinancing and savings in the case of the pledeability-maximizing contract is general.
We conjecture that the same equivalence holds for values of debt below the pledgeability-maximizing level, but we
have not formally established this result.
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(i.e., the high cash-flow realization on date t is given by K∆). In this case, the results of our model
continue to hold with some slight adjustments as long as the future is not discounted too heavily,
i.e., β ∈ [β, 1]. Intuitively, this case is essentially the opposite case to the model with cash-flow
growth analyzed in Section 3.1. As in the case of cash-flow growth, in this case the entrepreneur’s
IC constraint is affected. In particular, to support a repayment of K∆ today, the required number
of periods until the next repayment is now given by m > K (recall that with cash-flow growth
we have the opposite result, m < K). Setting aside integer constraints, the distance between
repayments m is implicitly pinned down by the condition that today’s repayment of K∆ has to be





Note that by setting β = 1 we recover the baseline model without discounting (m = K).
In addition to changing the spacing between repayment dates to m > K, the discounting of
promised future repayments affects the creditor’s breakeven constraint. All other things equal, in
the presence of discounting each promised future repayment is worth less than in the absence of
discounting. Together with the result that repayments are spaced m > K periods apart, discounting
therefore implies that more and earlier repayments are required to raise a given amount D relative
to the case without discounting.
When the future is discounted heavily, β ∈ (0, β), additional complications can arise. For
brevity, we only briefly sketch them here. First, it may be possible that the feasibility constraint
is never binding because the largest incentive-compatible repayment is strictly lower than K∆.
This is the case when β satisfies K∆ >
∑∞
i=1 β
i∆ = β1−β∆, such that even promising all future
cash flows to the entrepreneur is not sufficient to make a repayment of K∆ incentive compatible.
Second, with heavy discounting, it is possible that one early repayment of K∆ can raise the same
amount (or more) than two later repayments. If this is the case, then, unlike in the model without
discounting, it may no longer be optimal to backload the debt structure as much as possible. For
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example, with significant discounting it is possible that a debt contract with repayments of K∆
on dates 1 and 4 raises the same amount of funding as a debt contract with repayments of K∆ on
dates 2, 5, and 8. There is a nontrivial tradeoff between the two contracts. Under the first contract,
default risk is incurred earlier on but, because there are only two repayments, the overall probability
of default is lower. Of course, this complication arises only when time discounting is significant.
Without discounting (and, by continuity, with moderate discounting) moving repayments forward
does not reduce the number of required repayments, such that it remains optimal to backload the
debt structure as in the baseline model. Therefore, as long as β ≥ β, repayments are backloaded,
subject to incentive compatibility, even in the presence of discounting.
Entrepreneur has a higher discount rate than creditors: Finally, suppose that the entrepreneur
discounts the future more than creditors. For simplicity, we focus on the case in which the en-
trepreneur’s discount factor is βE < 1 and the creditors’ discount factor is βL = 1. Consider,
as before, an entrepreneur who is raising D to finance an investment. Because the entrepreneur
discounts the future more than creditors, there is now a second reason, in addition to avoiding early
liquidation, to schedule repayments as late as possible: Relative to the creditors, the entrepreneur
values early consumption more highly. However, the ability to schedule repayments as late as pos-
sible is limited by the fact that discounting changes the entrepreneur’s IC constraint (as discussed
above), therefore requiring a spacing of m > K between repayments. Hence, despite the additional
desire for late repayments that results from the difference in discounting, the entrepreneur ends up
having to make repayments earlier to guarantee incentive compatibility of the promised repayments.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of optimal debt structure in a multi-period setting. Building on
the insights of the literature on debt as a termination threat, which has mostly focused two-date
settings, our multi-period model shows how a rich optimal debt structure emerges from a simple
trade-off between providing the firm with incentives to repay and preventing costly early liquidation.
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Our model predicts that firms backload their debt structure subject to incentive compatibil-
ity—as they increase their borrowing, they add periodic risky repayments from the back of the
maturity structure, with the time between repayments increasing in cash-flow risk. Cash-flow
growth or a significant risk-free cash-flow component limit the number of periodic risky repayments
because they introduce additional costs of defaulting early. On the other hand, firms with low
cash-flow risk choose smooth maturity profiles with relatively safe repayments every period, rather
than riskier, periodic repayments. The model provides a unified framework to study debt maturity
and debt granularity, and its main results are robust to a number of extensions, including the
introduction of savings, refinancing, or discounting.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Because Q(R) = Q(R′), and Xt is either K∆ or 0, equation (5) implies that










Pr (Xs ≥ R′s) ∆.
In addition, since D(R) = D(R′), it follows from equation (4) that R and R′ will lead to the same V1.
Therefore, the entrepreneur is indifferent between R and R′.
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove this proposition by a series of claims.
Claim 1: For any two incentive compatible debt contracts, R and R′, if D(R) = D(R′) and Q ⊂ Q′, then
the entrepreneur strictly prefers R. Put differently, other things equal, the entrepreneur wants to reduce
the number of repayments.











Pr (Xs ≥ R′s) ∆ > 0.
Because Q ⊂ Q′, Pr (Xs ≥ Rs) ≥ Pr (Xs ≥ R′s) for all s ∈ T . However, since at least one element in Q′
does not belong to Q, there is at least one s′ ∈ T such that Rs′ = 0 and R′s′ ∈ (0,K∆]. Hence, at s′,
Pr (Xs′ ≥ Rs′) = 1 > 1/K = Pr (Xs′ ≥ R′s′). Therefore, the entrepreneur strictly prefers R.
Claim 2: Denote by #Q(R) the number of repayments of the debt contract R and by % the vector of
the repayment dates. If D(R) = D(R′), #Q(R) = #Q(R′), and % > %′ (that is, any element of % is greater
than or equal to %′, and at least one element of % is strictly greater than the corresponding element of %′),
then the entrepreneur strictly prefers R. Put differently, if two incentive compatible debt contracts have the
same value and the same number of repayments, the entrepreneur prefers the one with late repayments.
Because % > %′, for any t,
t−1∏
s=0
Pr (Xs ≥ Rs) ≥
t−1∏
s=0
Pr (Xs ≥ R′s), and there exists a repayment date
tj ∈ Q(R) that comes strictly later than the corresponding repayment date t′j ∈ Q(R′). Then, at tj ,
tj−1∏
s=0
Pr (Xs ≥ Rs) >
tj−1∏
s=0
Pr (Xs ≥ R′s). Therefore, the entrepreneur strictly prefers R.















Before proving claim, we state a repeatedly used adjustment procedure to the debt contract as a lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose ti, tj ∈ Q(R) are two repayment dates, with Rtj < K∆. Define “(ti, tj , ε) adjustment”
to be the following procedure to construct a new contract R′: R′ti = Rti − ε and R
′
tj = Rtj +
ε
Ki−j , leaving all
other repayments unchanged. Then, the value of debt is unchanged, D(R′) = D(R). In addition, if ti > tj,
then R′ is also incentive compatible.
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Proof of Lemma 3: First, it is straight forward from (3) that D(R′) = D(R). Next, if ti > tj ,
let V ′ be the entrepreneur’s continuation value under contract R′. It follows from equation (1) that the











Pr (Xs ≥ Rs)Ri.
Then, it is clear that V ′t ≥ Vt holds for all t and strictly for tj < t ≤ ti. In particular, V ′tj+1 = Vtj+1 +
ε
Ki−j ,
so condition R′tj ≤ V
′
tj+1 still holds. IC conditions for other repayments are trivially satisfied. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3.
We now prove Claim 3. Consider any debt contract R with #Q(R) ≤ n− 1 first. Let the ith repayment
date be ti ∈ Q. Note that the maximum amount of any single repayment is K∆; and Rti is actually paid if
and only if Xtτ = K∆ for all τ ≤ i, which happens with probability 1/Ki. Therefore, the maximum total














by equation (15). Hence, creditor’s IR constraint (2) implies that there must be at least n repayments:
#Q(R) ≥ n.
Next, we show that any contract R with #Q(R) = n+k, where k ≥ 1, can be strictly improved. Suppose
there is a positive integer j < n+ k such that Rtj < K∆. Then, we can apply (n+ k, j, ε) adjustment until

















so the total expected value of repayments exceeds D, contradicting the IR constraint (2). In the second
case, the entrepreneur can eliminate the last repayment without affecting the value of debt. By Claim 1, the
adjusted repayment schedule is strictly preferred. Hence, we establish Claim 3.
Now, we prove Proposition 1. If D satisfies (8), then it automatically satisfies (15). Claim 3 implies that
the optimal debt contract will include exactly N repayments. Denote the optimal debt contract by R∗.
Next, we inductively prove that the ith repayment occurs at t∗i = T − j − (N − i)K. We first establish
the statement for i = N , namely t∗N = T − j. Consider any debt contract R whose last repayment date is
later than T − j. The incentive compatibility constraint implies that RtN ≤ (j − 1)∆. However, since the












, violating equation (8).
Consider any debt contract R with the last repayment date tN < T − j. We can apply (tN , ti, ε)
adjustment until Rti = K∆ for all i < N . After such an adjustment, condition (8) implies RtN ≤ j∆. So,
the entrepreneur can delay RtN to T − j without affecting incentive compatibility and the value of debt,
which by Claim 2, makes entrepreneur strictly better off. Hence, in R∗, t∗N = T − j.
Suppose t∗s = T − j − (N − s)K for all s ≥ i + 1. We now prove the statement for t∗i . First, starting
from R∗, we can apply (t∗i , t∗l , ε) adjustment for all l < i, until Rtl = K∆. Next, apply (t∗i , t∗l , ε) adjustment
for all l > i, until Rt∗l = K∆ (if l < N) or j∆ (if l = N). By Lemma 3, both adjustments do not affect the
value of debt, and the first one is incentive compatible. It is easy to see that the second adjustment is also


















⊂ ((K − 1)∆,K∆]. Therefore, IC condition for Rt∗i implies that
t∗i ≤ t∗i+1 −K. If t∗i < t∗i+1 −K, we can simply move Rt∗i to a later date: t
∗
i+1 −K. It is easy to see that
such an adjustment does not affect the value of debt and is still incentive compatible. By Claim 2, the new
contract dominates R∗, contracting with the optimality of R∗. Therefore, the induction conclusion holds for
i and t∗n = T − j − (N − n)K for any n ≤ N in R∗.







, we know from the previous proof that Q(R∗) = {T − j, T − j −
K, . . . , T − j − (N − 1)K}. IC conditions imply that R∗ti ≤ K∆ for i < N and R
∗
tN ≤ j∆. As a result,
D(R∗) ≤ D, with equality holding if and only if R∗ti = K∆ for i < N and R
∗
tN = j∆. This establishes the
uniqueness and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Part 1: Consider a debt contract R with #Q(R) = 1 first. We claim that the repayment date t = T −m
maximizes PI(1). To see this, we note thatRt has two upper bounds. First, Rt ≤ Kµt∆, due to the feasibility
















and so the incentive compatibility constraint must be binding to attain the maximum pledgeable income; that
is, Rt = Vt+1. Since Vt+1 is strictly decreasing in t, when t ∈ [T −m,T ), in order to achieve the maximum
pledgeability, the repayment date must be T −m, and the maximum pledgeable income is KµT−m∆.








So the feasibility constraint must be binding to maximize PI(1). Because Kµt∆ is strictly increasing in
t, in order to achieve the maximum pledgeability, the repayment date must be T −m, and the maximum
pledgeable income is KµT−m∆. Combining both cases, if #Q(R) = 1, PI(1) = KµT−m∆, which is attained
by making the only repayment at date T −m. By the same arguments, we show that for a debt contract R,
if tj ∈ Q and Rtj = Vtj+1 (i.e., Vtj = µtj∆), then the maximum repayment at the (j − 1)th repayment date
occurs at tj −m.
Now, let’s consider PI(2). For any debt contract R with #Q(R) = 2, suppose t2 = T − q. It follows
from the proof of the one repayment contract that q ≤ m. Then, in order to attain the maximum pledgeable
income, the entrepreneur can first set





As a consequence, t1 = t2 −m. Denote by PIq(N) the maximum pledgeable income of a contract with N















Suppose equation (16) holds, then PIq(2) is strictly increasing in q. Hence,




Let’s now compare PI(2) and PI(1) under equation (16).
PI(2) > PI(1)⇔ µ−m + 1
K
> 1. (17)









µs = µm − 1. (18)
Then, equation (17) is equivalent to 1− µm + µ
m




K > 0. The last
inequality is equivalent to equation (16). So, when n = 2, PI(2) = PIm(2) if and only if PI(2) > PI(1).
We now use induction. Assume that PI(n) = PIm(n) if and only if PI(n) > PI(n − 1), where n ≥ 2.
Let’s consider n + 1. Fix any tn+1 = T − q. When the contract can attain the largest pledgeable income,
























































Now, suppose equation (19) holds, then PI(n+ 1) = PIm(n+ 1). We then have





















It then follows from equation (18) that
1− µm = K
µ
−K.
So, equation (20) and equation (19) are equivalent. Therefore, if PI(n+1) = PIm(n+1), PI(n+1) > PI(n).




)n−j+1+ 1 > 0.
So, it follows from equation (11) that if and only if N ≤ N∗, PI(N) ≥ PI(N − 1). Therefore, PI(N) is
maximized at N = N∗.







Part 3: Now, suppose D ∈ (PI(N − 1), P I(N)]. By the definition of PI(N), since D > PI(N − 1), it
is impossible to design a contract with at most N − 1 repayment dates such that the creditor’s IR constraint
holds. But D ≤ PI(N), so there exists a contract with N repayments such that the creditor’s participation
constraint holds.
Consider any contract R with #Q = N + p (p ∈ Z+). Without loss of generality, we only consider
contracts with Rt = Kµ
t∆, ∀t ∈ Q \ {tN+p}. Otherwise, if Rtj < Kµtj∆, the entrepreneur can make the
(tN+p, tj , ε) adjustment, until either Rtj = Kµ
tj∆ or RtN+p = 0. The former case is under consideration,
while in the latter case, the entrepreneur is strictly better off. Note, in this process, the contract’s incentive
compatibility and the creditor’s participation constraint are preserved.
We now first claim that for any tj , tj+1 ∈ Q \ {t1}, tj+1 − tj ≥ m. Let tj ∈ Q be the last repayment
date at which tj+1 − tj < m. Because the original debt contract R is incentive compatible, it follows from
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the definition of m in equation (10) and Rs = Kµ











































where the first strict inequality is again due to the definition of m in equation (10). Such an inequality
contradicts to the assumption that RtN+p > 0 in the original contract, and so tN+p + 1 < T .
Then, the entrepreneur can construct a new contract R′ such that R′tN+p = 0, R
′
tN+p+1 = RtN+p , and
R′s = Rs for all other s. That is, the last repayment is delayed to date tN+p + 1. Let’s check the incentive





















Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint holds at date tN+p+1. Because ts+1− ts = m for all s ≥ j+1,
the incentive compatibility constraint holds at all these dates. At tj , because V
′
tj+1 > Vtj+1 (since all
subsequent repayment amounts are unchanged, and the last repayment is delayed), V ′tj > Vtj ; then, the
incentive compatibility of R implies the incentive compatibility of R′. Importantly, the creditor’s participa-
tion constraint does not change. Therefore, R′ satisfies both incentive compatibility constraint and creditor
participation constraint. Finally, because V ′tj > Vtj , and all repayments before tj are the same in R and R
′,
R’ is strictly better than R. This implies that our original assumption tj+1 − tj < m is invalid.
We then only need to consider a contract with tj+1− tj ≥ m for any tj , tj+1 ∈ Q\ {t1}. Since tN+p < T
and p ≥ 1, tN+p − (N + p− j)m < T − (N − j + 1)m. Hence, if the entrepreneur offers a contract R′ with
#Q′ = N , the jth repayment day could be T − (N − j + 1)m, which is late than the jth repayment date in
the original contract R. Therefore, there exists R′ with #Q′ = N that is strictly better than R. Therefore,
when D ∈ (PI(N − 1), P I(N)], the optimal contract has exactly N repayment dates. In addition, since
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tj+1 − tj = m and T − tN ≤ m, the first repayment date t1 ≥ T −Nm.
Part 4: WhenD = PI(N), the optimal debt contract must have tN = T−m, because PI(N) = PIm(N).
Then, Q = {T − m,T − 2m, ..., T − Nm}. In addition, to attain the maximum pledgeable income, the
entrepreneur must make the largest repayment at each repayment date, so Rt = Kµ
t∆, implying that the
schedule proposed is the unique one to attain D = PI(N), which can be attained by the repayment schedule
Rt =
{
µtK∆, if t ∈ {T −m,T − 2m, ..., T −Nm}
0, otherwise.




)j+ 1 = (µ−1 − 1)K(Kµ−m) + 1. (21)
Note that (µ−1 − 1)K = 1− µm, equation (21) becomes Kµ−m −K + 1, which is negative because
1 > 1K + µ
−m. So when 1 > 1K + µ
−m, N∗ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose on the contrary that a risky contract R maximizes the value of debt.
Denote by t ≤ T − 1 the last risky repayment date. Construct a new contract R′ such that R′s = Rs for all
s < t or s > t+ 1, R′t = L, and R
′
t+1 = Rt+1 + max(0, Rt −∆− L) < Rt.
The new contract R′ is incentive compatible because for any s,
V ′s ≥ (∆ + L) +
1
K
(V ′s+1 −Rs) ≥ ∆ + L,
so all risk-free repayments R′s ≤ L when s > t+1 are automatically incentive compatible. In addition, R′t+1 is




V ′t+2 = Vt+2 = Vt+1 +Rt+1 − (∆ + L) ≥ Rt +Rt+1 − (∆ + L) = R′t+1.
Finally, note that
V ′t − Vt
≥
[






(∆ + L) +




Rt+1 +Rt − (∆ + L)−R′t+1
K
> 0,
Therefore, we can recursively show that V ′s > Vs for all s ≤ t and R′s = Rs is thereby incentive compatible.
Next we show D(R′) > D(R). This is because when (12) holds,




≥ L− ∆ + L
K
> 0.
Contradiction with the maximality of R. Therefore, risk-free schedule Rs = L maximizes pledgeability.
Proof of Proposition 4: We prove this proposition in four parts.
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Part 1: Let N be the number of risky repayments. We show that the value of any repayment profile
with N 6= N∗∗ can be strictly improved. Let’s first consider a contract R with N > N∗∗. Suppose tN < T
is the last risky repayment date. If there is a t < t1 ∈ Q, such that Rt < L, the entrepreneur can simply
set R′t = L to increase the value of the contract. If t ∈ (tj , tj+1), the entrepreneur can apply the (tj , t, ε)
adjustment, until either R′t = L or R
′
tj = 0. In the former case, the value of the contract does not change; in
the latter case, the value of the contract will increase, because all repayment after tj become less risky. Note
that in the adjustment process, the incentive compatibility is preserved. Hence, without loss of generality,
we can consider the debt contract R, in which at any t /∈ Q, Rt = L. The entrepreneur can then apply the
(tj , tj+1, ε) adjustment for tj , tj+1 ∈ Q, such that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding at each
risky repayment date. (Here, we take tN+1 = T . It is possible that tj+1 − tj > K, and so the incentive
compatibility at tj+1 cannot be binding. However, in this case, the entrepreneur can just set R
′
tj+1 = L and
R′tj+1+1 = K∆ + L to increase the value of the contract.) This is guaranteed one-by-one from the last risky
repayment date. In addition, the value of the contract does not change in the adjustment process. Therefore,
below, we only need to show that a contract R with Rs = L for all s /∈ Q and Rt = Vt+1 for all t ∈ Q can
be strictly improved.
We can construct a new contract R′: R′s = Rs for all s < t1 and s > tN + 1, R′t1 = L, R
′
s+1 = Rs for all
s ∈ [t1, tN − 1], and R′tN+1 = (T − (tN + 1)) ∆ + L. (If tN + 1 = T , R
′
tN+1 = 0. This case will be nested in
the following proof.) Since Rs = L for all s ∈ [tN + 2, T − 1] and RT = 0, V ′tN+2 = (T − (tN + 1)) ∆ + L.
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding at tN + 1. What’s more, V
′
tN+1 = VtN = ∆ + L.
Therefore, at each previous date, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding.








(T − (tN + 1)) ∆− ((T − tN ) ∆ + L)
KN
=L− ∆ + L
KN
> 0
Here, the first inequality is strict when tN + 1 = T , and the last inequality is due to the definition of N
∗∗.
Next, consider the case with N < N∗∗. Without loss of generality, we assume that Rs = L for all s < t1.
The entrepreneur can construct the following new contract R′: R′s = Rs for all s < t1 −K, R′s = Rs+K for
all s ∈ [t1 −K,T − 1 −K], R′T−K = K∆ + L, and R′s = L for all s > T −K. Since there are K periods
after date T −K, R′T−K is incentive compatible. In addition, because R′T−K = K∆ + L and R′s = L for all
s > T −K, V ′T−K = ∆ +L; hence, at any repayment date s < T −K, R′ is incentive compatible because R
is incentive compatible.
Note that N < N∗∗, and so L < (∆ + L)/KN+1. Therefore, we have
D(R′)−D(R) = K(∆ + L)
KN+1
−KL > 0,
Hence, the pledgeable income after adding the extra risky repayment increases. Therefore, PI(N) is maxi-
mized at N∗∗.
Part 2: In the remainder of the proof, we assume N ≤ N∗∗. When N = 1, to maximize the value of the
debt, obviously IC condition must be binding at the risky repayment date t1, and that at any date s < t1,
Rs = L. First, it is easy to see that t1 ≥ T −K; otherwise, because Rs ≤ L for all s > t1, so
Vt1+1 ≥ (T − t1)∆ + L > K∆ + L ≥ Rt1
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and IC condition cannot possibly bind. For any t1 > T −K, we can construct a new contract R′: Rs = L







(t1 − (T −K))L+
(T − t1)(∆ + L)
K
]







Hence, D(R′)−D(R) ≥ 0, because t1 ≥ T−K and N ≤ N∗∗. Note that the inequality is strict if t1 > T−K;
hence, PI(1) is uniquely attained by Rt1 = K∆ + L at date t1 = T −K, and Rs = L at date s 6= t1. Then,
PI(1) = (T − 1−K)L+ (∆ + L).
Now, let’s consider any N ≤ N∗∗ and consider a contract R with #Q = N . Fixing all repayments at
dates s ≥ t2, we have Vt2+1 ≥ Rt2 by the incentive compatibility of R. Then, as the same argument of the
case N = 1, the value of the contract is maximized when t1 = t2 −K, Rt1 = K∆ + L, Rs = L for all s < t2
but s 6= t1. We can now increase the value of the contract by increasing Rt2 to Vt2+1. Similarly, fixing all
repayments at dates s ≥ tn for all n ≤ N , the value of the contract is maximized by setting tj = tj −K for
all j < n, Rtj = K∆ + L at date tj for all j < n, and Rs = L at dates s < tn but s 6= tj for any tj < tn.
Then, finally, because RT = VT+1 = 0, the contract’s value is maximized by setting tN = T −K.
Therefore, in order to maximize the pledgeable income, the entrepreneur needs to make risky repayment
at dates t = T − iK, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In addition, at each risky repayment date, the risky repayment
should be K∆ + L, such that both the feasibility constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint
binding; at other dates, the entrepreneur needs to repay L. Therefore, the maximum pledgeable income of
a debt contract with N repayment dates is






Part 3: For any N ≤ N∗∗, if D ∈ (PI(N − 1), P I(N)], by the definition of PI(N), the entrepreneur
cannot use a contract with at most N − 1 repayment dates to attain D, but she can use a contract with N
repayment dates to attain D.
Now, we show that a contract with N + p repayments, where p ≥ 1, can be strictly improved. The first
step is to show that at all dates when the entrepreneur does not make risky repayment, the entrepreneur
repays L. Suppose there is one date t such that Rt < L. If t is earlier than the first risky repayment t1, the
entrepreneur apply the (t, t1,ε) adjustment by setting R
′
t = Rt + ε and R
′
t1 = Rt1 −Kε. Then, the creditor’s
participation constraint does not change, and the entrepreneur is at least as good as before (strictly better if
R′t1 ≤ L after the adjustment). If t ∈ (tj , tj+1), then the entrepreneur can make the (tj , t, ε) adjustment by
setting R′tj = Rtj − ε and R
′
t = Rt + ε. Such an adjustment will not change the incentive compatibility and
the creditor’s participation constraint either; again, the entrepreneur is at least not worse off. Hence, when
consider the optimal debt contract, the entrepreneur will repay L when she does not make risky repayments.
Then, the rest of the proof is the same as that of Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 1 by iterated application
of the (tN+p, ti, ε) adjustments.
As shown above, in the optimal debt contract, tj+1 − tj ≤ K and tN ≥ T − K; otherwise, if some
tj < tj+1 −K (we can denote by tN+1 = T ), it is strictly better for the entrepreneur to set R′tj = L and
R′tj+1 = Rtj . Such a new contract is still incentive compatible, because the value between tj + 1 and tj will
be greater than or equal to K(∆ + L). Therefore, t1 ≥ T −NK.
Part 4: For any N ≤ N∗∗, if D = PI(N), the optimal debt contract will have exactly N risky repayment
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dates. Then, by Part 2, to attain D by a contract with N risky repayment dates, the entrepreneur has to
repay K∆ + L at dates ti = T − iK (for i = 1, 2, . . . , N) and repay L at all other dates. Therefore, there is
a unique optimal contract that attains D, which is
Rt =
{
K∆ + L, if t ∈ {T −K,T − 2K, ..., T −NK}
L otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose D satisfies (8). Proposition 1 uniquely determines the set of repayment
dates. Suppose ART is attained by some schedule R other than the one specified in the lemma. Then,
there must exist an i ∈ [2, N − 1] such that Rti < K∆, or i = N and Rti < j∆. Given such an i, consider







i = N), schedule R′ is still incentive compatible. By Lemma 3, D(R′) = D(R). The adjusted schedule R′
increases ART :
ART (R′)−ART (R) = ε(ti − t1)
KD
> 0.
Contradiction! So ART is uniquely attained by RtN = j∆, Rti = K∆ for all i ∈ [2, N − 1], and





































(N − i− 1)− (N − 1) (K∆−Rt1)
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which is equivalent to equation (14).





decreasing in K directly imply that #Q is weakly increasing in K. It follows from Proposition 1 that if
ti, ti+1 ∈ Q, then ti+1 − ti = K. So, it is obvious that the time interval between two consecutive
repayments is strictly increasing in K.
We now study ART as K increases to K + 1. It follows from equation (14) that ART can be rewritten
as













Obviously, if the increase in K does not change Q, ART will decrease. Otherwise, suppose that the increase
in K leads to a change of Q. First, simple algebra shows that ART is decreasing in N and j respectively.
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Let NK and jK be the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 1 given K. Then, if NK+1 ≥ NK and jK+1 ≥ jK ,
then ART (K + 1) < ART (K). Finally, we prove the result for NK+1 > NK and 1 ≤ jK − jK+1 ≤ K − 1:
ART (K + 1)−ART (K)















































































































































































(NK+1 − i) +
2KjK∆
KNK






















(NK+1 − i) +
2KjK∆
KNK
− (NK+1 − jK+1)∆
(K + 1)NK+1−1
 .
Note, the second term in the bracket is 0 if NK ≤ 3; in such a case, simple mathematical induction can show










(NK+1 − 1− i) +
2KjK∆
KNK



































implies that ART (K + 1) < ART (K). Hence, the conclusion holds for any NK+1 > NK and jK+1 < jK . In
all, ART decreases in K.
Proof of Prediction 2: Assume the variance of per-period cash flow is a constant: ∆2 (K − 1) = α2 for
some constant α > 0. Denote the solution by ∆K =
α√
K−1 , which is decreasing in K. Therefore,











)i is increasing in ∆, so Claim 3 in
the proof of Proposition 1 implies that #Q is decreasing in ∆.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that ART increases as ∆ increases. We only consider the increase
in ∆ that decreases K to a smaller integer. Without loss of generality, we focus on the comparison between
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ART (∆K+1) and ART (∆K). Let’s first consider the case that Q does not change. From (14),

















When ∆ increases from ∆K+1 to ∆K without changing Q, ART increases, because ART is strictly decreasing
in K. Similarly, if NK+1 ≥ NK and jK+1 ≥ jK , ART also increases in ∆. Hence, we only need to show that
the same property holds in the case that jK − jK+1 ≤ K − 1 and NK+1 ≥ NK + 1. Similar to the proof of
Prediction 1, we have
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2KjK∆
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In the last inequality, the sum of the first three terms is negative when K ≥ 4, and the sum of the last term
is less than 0 as in the proof of Prediction 1. Therefore, under the condition that K ≥ 4, ART (∆K+1) >
ART (∆K). This completes the proof.
Proof of Prediction 3: Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 1 directly implies that #Q is weakly
increasing in D. In the rest of the proof, we studyART (D) as D increases. There are two cases depending
on whether D is at the boundary of (8).
Case 1: Both D and D+ ε satisfy (8) for some common N and j. It then follows from equation (14) that

















Therefore, if the increase in D does not change Q, ART (D) is strictly decreasing in D.
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for some N and j = 0, 1, ...,K − 1. When D marginally increases
to D + ε, the equilibrium debt contract then features #Q = N and tN = T − (j + 1). Therefore,
lim
ε→0
ART (D + ε)
= lim
ε→0














− (j + 1)∆
KN
)]










D < 1. Therefore, we conclude that ART (D) is strictly decreasing in D if the marginal
change of D does not change Q; however, when the marginal increase in D leads to a different set of
repayment dates, ART has a discrete drop.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider a repayment schedule with Rt > K∆ for some t ∈ Q. Let Rtj be the
last repayment with Rtj > K∆. There are two cases. First, the repayment schedule has exactly j
repayments, and so Rtj is also the last repayment. Then,






otherwise, Rtj > Vtj+1, violating the incentive compatibility constraint. Then, fix all previous j − 1
repayments (the time and the amount), the entrepreneur may consider the following adjustment:
R′tj = K∆ and R
′
tj+K
= Rtj −K∆. Such a new repayment schedule is still incentive compatible;
otherwise, if R′tj+K > Vtj+K+1 = (T − tj −K)∆, Rtj > (T − tj)∆ = Vtj+1, violating the assumption that
the original repayment schedule is incentive compatible.
Because the first j − 1 repayments do not change, if the entrepreneur can repay Rtj at date tj , she is
able to make the repayments R′tj and R
′
tj+K
(because of saving). Indeed, there is a positive probability





, because the project
may generate positive cash flows between tj + 1 and tj + K. In addition, because of saving, the creditor’s
participation constraint is also satisfied. Therefore, the entrepreneur can even reduce R′tj+K to a certain
R′′tj+K and still keep the creditor’s participation constraint satisfied.
Now, let’s compare Vtj and V
′
tj . Denote by St the total funds the entrepreneur can use to make repayment
at date t. We can calculate



















































−R′′tj+K + (T − tj −K)∆
)
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In addition, if Stj ≥ Rtj , then Stj −R′tj = R
′
tj+K






































tj+K + (T − tj −K)∆
)
=Vtj
Hence, the adjustment makes the entrepreneur strictly better off.
In the second case, the repayment schedule has more than j repayments. Then, by assumption, all
repayments after date tj are at most K∆. The entrepreneur can then make all the repayments after date tj
as late as possible, until that delaying one of these repayments one date will violate the incentive compatibility.
Then, the entrepreneur can iteratedly apply the (ti−1, ti, ε) adjustment for all i ≥ j beginning from i = N (the
last repayment), such that the incentive compatibility constraint binding at each repayment date after date
tj . The entrepreneur will not be worse off by this adjustment, for the same reason as in the first case. Suppose






Hence, the same argument in the first case will prove that such a contract is not optimal for the entrepreneur.
B Numerical Solution
This appendix describes the numerical procedure used to calculate the results in Section 3.3, where
we present optimal debt structures when the period cash flow Xt follows an IID lognormal distri-
bution.
We calculate the optimal debt structure using numerical finite-horizon dynamic programming
methods. Recall that, written recursively, the value function at the beginning of period t is given
by.
Vt = E(Xt) + Pr(Xt ≥ Rt) (−Rt + Vt+1) .
The optimal debt structure R = {Rt} is then the solution to the following maximization problem:
maxR V1
s.t. Rt ≤ Vt+1 (IC)
D(R) = D (IR), (22)
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Pr(Xs ≥ Rs)Rt, (23)
and the parameter D is the amount of outside financing that needs to be raised. We assume that





where −σ22 and σ are the mean and the volatility parameters of the underlying normal distribution,
so that the expected period cash flow is normalized to E(Xt) = 1.
In describing the numerical algorithm it is useful to define the amount of financing raised by







The algorithm we use to solve for the optimal repayment profile is essentially backward induc-
tion.
1. Grid points: We first solve for the single-peariod pledgeability-maximizing face value
R = arg max
R
P (Xt ≥ R)R.
We then discretize the interval [0, R + 0.1] at increments of 0.1, rounding up R + 0.1 to the
closest decimal point. In total, depending on the parametrization, there are around NR = 20
grid points for R. We discretize value of debt D using ND = 1, 000, 000 to 10, 000, 000
points on [0, Dmax], where Dmax is picked to be slightly above the firm’s borrowing capacity
(i.e., maximum pledgeable income). To achieve better computational efficiency we choose the
lowest possible Dmax that does not impose a binding constraint on the optimization problem.
The computational challenge is that the grid points on D must be much finer than the grid
points on R in order to guarantee the precision of the algorithm. For example, when the
date-10 face value R10 changes by one grid of 0.1, its impact on the value of debt D1 is scaled
by the survival probabilities given several positive earlier repayments. Hence, in order for the
algorithm to detect variations in all Rt, the number of grid points for D must be orders of
magnitude larger than the number of grid points for R. This issue becomes more severe when
there are more potential repayment dates and thereby acts as a constraint on the number
of dates T for which we can numerically calculate the optimal debt structure. Section 3.3
presents results for an 11-period model (T = 11). For these results we have checked that the
discretization is fine enough. In particular, the results are unchanged when we move to even
finer levels of discretization in D.
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2. Given T = 11 periods in total, we have the following initial conditions:
D∗11 = 0,
(no financing can be raised by promising repayments only at date 11) and
V ∗11(D11) =
{
E(X11) = ∆ if D11 ≤ 0
0 if D11 > 0
.
3. Given V ∗t+1(Dt+1), we then solve R
∗
t (Dt) and V
∗
t (Dt) using a standard recursive formulation:
(a) For a given Dt, for any Rt in the grid, we solve for D̂t+1, such that
Dt = P (Xt ≥ Rt)(Rt + D̂t+1).
D̂t+1 represents the required value of repayments from date t + 1 onward in order to
raise Dt at date t. If D̂t+1 > Dmax, then the repayment profile is infeasible and can be
discarded because under this repayment profile the firm cannot possibly raise Dt.
(b) We then verify that the IC holds:
Rt ≤ V ∗t+1(D̂t+1).
If the IC does not hold, then this Rt should not be considered as a candidate for the
following maximization problem.
(c) We then choose Rt such that equity value Vt is maximized:
R∗t = arg max
Rt
E(Xt) + P (Xt ≥ Rt)(−Rt + V ∗t+1(D̂t+1)),
where the D̂t+1 is the continuation value of debt calculated in (a) and (b). Finally, using
the optimal R∗t , we calculate
V ∗t (Dt) = E(Xt) + P (Xt ≥ R∗t )(−R∗t + V ∗t+1(D̂t+1)),
completing the iteration for period t.
4. For any initial value of D = D1, we calculate the stream of R
∗
t for t = 1, 2, ..., 10 (recall that
R11 is necessarily zero).
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